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INTRODUCTION
In an ideal world, contracts would explicitly allocate rights and
responsibilities between contracting parties for all possible contingen-
cies that might arise over the life of the contract. In reality, of course,
contracting parties cannot foresee all possible contingencies that
might bear on the operation of the contract. Furthermore, preparing
for all foreseeable contingencies, no matter how remote, can be both
difficult and costly. Consequently, all but the simplest contracts are,
to some extent, obligationally incomplete'-there are gaps in the con-
tract's explicit and implicit provisions that leave the parties' obliga-
tions unspecified under certain contingencies.2 It falls to public
1 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729, 730 (1992):
Legal scholars use the term "incomplete contracting" to refer to contracts
in which the obligations are not fully specified.... A contract that failed to
specify the seller's obligations in the event of a flood or the buyer's breach
would thus be obligationally incomplete....
Economics scholars, on the other hand, use the term "incomplete con-
tracting" to refer to contracts that fail to fully realize the potential gains
from trade in all states of the world.
2 I use the term "incomplete" to refer to situations in which the parties have left an
issue unaddressed, as distinguished from instances in which the parties have attempted to
address an issue but have done so with terms that are ambiguous or that are subject to
more than one meaning. See Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate Over Default Rules in Con-
tract Law, 3 S. CAL. IteRmsc. LJ. 235, 236-37 (1993) (distinguishing "substantive" incom-
pleteness from "interpretive" incompleteness). The latter is a problem of interpreting
parties' language rather than of creating legal rules to fill gaps in contracts which the
parties have left. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default
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institutions-courts and legislatures-to create background, or "de-
fault," rules to govern private relationships when such unaddressed
contingencies arise and private ordering, thus, has failed. The process
by which lawmakers should determine the substance of such default
rules has been a subject of much discussion in the contract-theory
literature, especially over the last decade.3
With a few exceptions, 4 law-and-economics theorists concerned
with selecting efficient legal rules have shaped and dominated the de-
bate. The centrality of efficiency concerns in this debate is both pre-
dictable and justifiable. Default rules, by their nature, are not
instruments well-suited to protecting third parties from deleterious ef-
fects of contracts, or to protecting the parties from each other. For
example, it would make little sense for lawmakers to enact default rules
prohibiting fraud in contract negotiations in order to protect con-
tracting parties, or prohibiting contracts for illegal services in order to
protect nonparties, rather than enacting substantively identical
mandatory, or "immutable," rules which private parties are not free to
change.5 Default rules enacted for such purposes would likely fail to
Rules: An Essay on Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARaozo L. REv. 2225, 2235 (1995) (explaining the
distinction drawn by Lieber and Corbin between the judge's first step in resolving a con-
tract dispute, interpreting the expressions of the parties, and the second step, invoked
when the first fails to resolve the case, of "supply[ing] terms to fill the gap discovered by
interpretation"). This Article is concerned only with gap-filling, not with interpretation.
3 For a particularly good dialogue on the subject, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)
(applying game theory to the question of how lawmakers should create contract default
rules to facilitate efficient contracts);Jason ScottJohnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Eco-
nomic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YAIE L.J. 615 (1990) (employing game theory, but
challenging Ayres and Gertner's conclusions); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1 (responding
to Johnston); see also Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. GAL. INTERDIsc.
L.J. 1 (1993) (featuring 17 pieces on theoretical perspectives on contract default rules);
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv.
821 (1992) (discussing the default rule approach to gap-filing);Jules L. Coleman et al., A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989) (applying an economic analysis to default rules); Ian Ayres,
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fische 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
1391 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)) (considering default contract rules in the arena of
corporate law).
4 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 880 (arguing that consent is the fundamental
value that contract law should uphold, and that this value is best insured through default
rules that "reflect the commonsense or conventional expectations that likely are part of the
tacit assumptions of particular parties"). But see Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legiti-
macy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDisc. LJ. 115, 118 (1993) (arguing that
the principle of consent is inferior to the coordination principle in creating default rules
because default terms become operable only when the parties have failed to consent to any
particular allocation of rights and responsibilities).
5 See Burton, supra note 4, at 139-40 (suggesting that if lawmakers wish to enforce
communitarian norms, a mandatory-not default-rule is appropriate, and that if
lawmakers decide to create only a default rule, there is no authority for pushing parties in
one direction based on normative principles). This does not stop some theorists from
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achieve their desired purpose and instead, would merely increase
transaction costs.
By enacting a default rule to govern a contingency, then,
lawmakers implicitly render a determination that the desires of the
parties to a transaction will be permitted to take precedence over
other policy concerns.6 When the parties leave contractual gaps, de-
fault rules can best approximate the parties' desires by maximizing
their joint wealth or utility. Defaults that achieve this purpose can be
characterized as efficient under a Pareto standard 7 because, by divid-
ing the joint gains, both parties may be better off than they would be
under any other default rule.
But while efficiency is a proper goal of contract default rules, con-
tracts scholars concerned with selecting efficient default rules uni-
formly base their analyses upon a dubious assumption about the
behavior of contracting parties: that the contracting parties' prefer-
ences for the substantive terms of their contracts remain the same re-
gardless of the choice of default rules. For example, some buyers
might prefer the delivery of goods on Tuesdays and others on
Wednesdays, but whether lawmakers determine that the default deliv-
ery day for contracts is to be Tuesdays or Wednesdays will not affect
which day any individual buyer would prefer. This Article considers
this assumption-which I will call the "preference exogeneity assump-
tion"-and its implications.
This Article has two primary purposes. First, it argues that the
preference exogeneity assumption is false. My thesis is that when
lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive prefer-
ences of contracting parties shift-that term becomes more desirable,
and other competing terms becoming less desirable. Put another way,
proposing that even default rules, rather than just mandatory rules, be used to promote
socially desired values. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doc-
trine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1002 (1985) ("In its manifold guises, contract doctrine promises that
the source of our deepest anxiety, the chasm between self and other, could be bridged.");
Jay M. Feinman, CriticalApproaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 857 (1983) ("Con-
tract law, as part of the sphere in which we as legal people operate can be a vehicle for
revolutionary intellectual activity at two levels: the utopian and the immediate."); Jay M.
Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Artice, 61 FoRDHAm L. Ray. 303, 311-15 (1992) (favor-
ing "relational contracts," which "emphasize the interdependence of individuals in social
and economic relationships").
6 The drafters of contract code provisions have made such a determination in the
vast majority of circumstances. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995) (stating that "[t]he effect
of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this
Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care pre-
scribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement"); Edith Resnick Warkentine, Arti-
cle 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default
Provisions, 30J. MARsHALL L. REv. 39, 44 (1996) ("Freedom of contract is a guiding princi-
ple of the U.C.C. This means that the contracting parties are free to reach any agree-
ment.") (footnote omitted).
7 For a definition of Pareto efficiency, see infra note 52.
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contracting parties view default terms as part of the status quo, and
they prefer the status quo to alternative states, all other things equal.
This Article supports this contention with the first thorough series of
controlled experiments designed to test the preference exogeneity as-
sumption in the context of contract default rules. Second, this Article
describes why the falsity of the preference exogeneity assumption mat-
ters. It explores the implications of this "status quo bias" that contract
default terms create and provides a theory of how lawmakers should
select contract default rules to neutralize the status quo bias. I suggest
that the proper approach to the problem is to create default rules
"tailored" to the circumstances of particular contracting parties or to
impose "non-enforcement" defaults, in which courts refuse to enforce
a contract unless the parties explicitly provide for certain
contingencies.
Part I of the Article provides context by reviewing the debate
within the law-and-economics community over whether "majoritarian"
or "penalty" defaults are more efficient and explains how the prefer-
ence exogeneity assumption is embedded in both of the competing
theories. Part II reviews the literature from psychology and experi-
mental economics on the status quo bias (also known as the endow-
ment effect), which describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the
status quo to alternatives, all other things equal. It then explains how
evidence of the status quo bias in other contexts is potentially-but
not necessarily-relevant to the question of how lawmakers can best
create efficient contract default rules.
Part III describes and reports the results of a series of controlled
laboratory experiments designed to test thoroughly for the first time
whether the status quo bias renders false the preference exogeneity
assumption of economic approaches to contract default rules.
Although no single set of experiments can provide incontrovertible
evidence in support of a point, the experimental results strongly sug-
gest that the preference exogeneity assumption is inaccurate in many
circumstances. Part III also considers what motivational theories best
explain the existence of the status quo bias in the default rules
context.
Part IV analyzes the implications of the status quo bias for default-
rules theory and public policy, arguing that, to a far greater degree
than previously believed, (1) the content of default rules is important;
(2) majoritarian default rules are more desirable and penalty default
rules less desirable; and (3) default terms tailored by courts to the
circumstances of specific contracting parties or non-enforcement de-
faults are more desirable, and generic default terms applicable to all




THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEFAULT RuLEs
A. The Problem of Transaction Costs
The Coase theorem8 is generally understood to predict that con-
tracting parties will bargain to the efficient allocation of rights and
responsibilities, irrespective of initial entitlements if and only if trans-
action costs are low.9 Consequently, in a Coasean world, parties will
agree on efficient contract terms if transaction costs are low, irrespec-
tive of the substance of default rules. 10 The corollary to this applica-
tion of the Coase theorem is that when transaction costs are high,
contracting parties will not contract around inefficient defaults."
Given the centrality of the Coase theorem to the law-and-econom-
ics movement,12 it is not surprising that the traditional law-and-eco-
nomics analysis of contract default rules focuses on problems created
by transaction costs in private contracting. The traditional analysis
concludes that default contract terms should mimic' 3 those terms that
8 For the original version of this analysis, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
9 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 81-82 (2d ed.
1997). Although the theorem is often stated as requiring zero transaction costs, it logically
requires only that the difference in valuation of a legal right between two parties exceed
the costs of reallocating the right through bargaining. See, e.g., StewartJ. Schwab, Collective
Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CoRNF_.L L. REv. 245, 266-67 (1987). Schwab notes:
Obviously the Coasean assumption of zero transaction costs is stylized, but
the Coasean prediction will often remain accurate with a less extreme as-
sumption. Specifically, transaction costs will not impede efficient bargain-
ing whenever the difference in values that the [parties] place on an item
exceeds the costs of bargaining over the item.
Id.
10 See ROBERT A. HI.LMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALIS AND CRr-
TIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 225 (1997) (discussing the assump-
tion of neoclassical legal economists that if parties could bargain without cost and with
perfect information, they would agree on contract terms that are efficient because they
would allocate risk to the superior risk bearer or superior risk avoider); cf. Bernard S.
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial7: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 557
(1990) (concluding that default rules in corporate law "aren't very important" because
lawyers can draft standard form contracts that opt out of the default terms, thus minimiz-
ing transaction costs).
11 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract 11 BELLJ. ECON. 466,
468 (1980) ("[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumerating and bargaining over contrac-
tual obligations under the full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally impractical to
make contracts which approach completeness.").
12 Coase's article, Coase, supra note 8, establishing what has come to be known as the
Coase theorem, is one of the most frequently cited articles in law reviews and perhaps the
most frequently cited article in economics journals. For a brief description of its impact,
see Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem,
83 VA. L. REv. 397, 398-404 (1997).
13 Coase himself suggested that lawmakers could respond to the problem of transac-
tion costs by assigning rights so as to mimic transactions that would take place in a market
free of transaction costs or to reduce transaction costs so as to facilitate the efficient trans-
fer of rights. Coase, supra note 8, at 17-18. Law-and-economics scholars have since debated
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the majority of contracting parties would agree upon if negotiating
and drafting a relevant provision were cost-free. 14 Default rules cre-
ated according to this process, often referred to as "majoritarian" de-
faults,15 minimize the number of occasions in which parties will need
to contract around default rules in order to arrive at an efficient out-
come.16 This approach minimizes the two forms of inefficiency that
transaction costs can create: inefficient contract terms and the trans-
action costs themselves.
When transaction costs are high, majoritarian defaults minimize
the number of inefficient contracts that result from the failure of par-
which of these approaches is preferable in different circumstances. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEcAL. STUDIES 123-24 (1987) (weighing the benefits and disadvan-
tages of both systems).
14 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CoRPoRATE LAW 15 (1991) ("[C]orporate law should contain the terms people would have
negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm's length for every contingency sufficiently
low."); id. at 250 ("The right inquiry is always what the parties would have contracted for
had transaction costs been nil.. . ."); HLMAN, supra note 10, at 225 ("[I]n theory the
efficient gap-filling or 'default' rule is what most parties would want."); RICHARD A. PosNEa,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 396 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that default rules should "supply[ ]
standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agree-
ment"); CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theoy
of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983) (stating that lawmakers should
create default terms by asking, "[What arrangements would most bargainers prefer?");
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YE LJ. 353,
361 (1988) (positing that default rules should provide "the contract that most well-in-
formed persons would have adopted if they were to bargain about the matter"). This tradi-
tional economic analysis has worked its way into the body of case law, like so many other
basic economic analyses of law, via Judge Posner's pen. See Market Street Assocs. Ltd. Part-
nership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) ("[T]he overriding purpose
of contract law. . . is to give the parties what they would have stipulated for expressly if at
the time of making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the future and the
costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the contract had been zero.").
15 See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL.
IN-IRDhsc. L.J. 1, 5 (1993).
16 See HrriMAN, supra note 10, at 226 (noting that majoritarian default terms "de-
crease[ ) the overall cost of contracting because [they] save[ ] most future parties the ex-
pense ('transaction costs') of bargaining to supplant a different gap-filling rule"); see also
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1841 (1991); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of
Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDisC. LJ. 389, 399 (1993). Determining which default is effi-
cient for the majority of parties is often quite difficult in practice. See HiLamu, supra note
10, at 226-27 (providing examples of this difficulty). Some theorists have recommended
that policymakers observe whatever term most parties reach privately. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at WilM4 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 951 (1984) ("A rule of
construction is often chosen because it reflects the dominant practice in a given class of
cases and because that practice is itself regarded as making good sense for the standard
transactions it governs."); Schwab, supra note 9, at 286-87 ("One way [to] decide which
party values the entitlement most highly[,I and thus would have obtained the entitlement
in a costless market[,] is to look to actual contracts."). However, in a mature legal system,
there is usually a default, which means that parties that explicitly address an issue by con-
tract will likely be those for whom the default is inefficient, even if they do not represent a
majority of all affected parties. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 115-16.
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ties to contract around the default rules. When transaction costs are
low (and, therefore, parties are expected to negotiate efficient con-
tracts regardless of the default terms), majoritarian defaults minimize
the number of parties that must incur costs by negotiating explicit
contract terms rather than taking the cheaper route of leaving a "gap"
in the contract for a default term to fill. Commentators have argued,
for example, that the "off-the-rack" provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC") are majoritarian defaults that save most parties
the expense of specifying such terms as time of delivery, place of deliv-
ery, or even price in their agreements.' 7
The efficiency argument for majoritarian default rules implicitly
assumes that the costs of contracting around a default rule are the
same, on average, for the majority of parties for whom the default
term is efficient and the minority who would prefer a different term.
If transaction costs are systematically higher for those in the "minor-
ity" than those in the "majority," strictly majoritarian defaults may not
be efficient, even assuming transaction costs are the primary cause of
contractual inefficiency.' 8 Thus, in some instances, total transaction
costs might be minimized by requiring a "low cost" majority of parties
to contract around a default rule so that the "high cost" minority of
parties do not have to do so.' 9 Consequently, a variation on the basic
majoritarian approach would require lawmakers to account for any
differential between costs of contracting for parties in the majority
and those in the minority.
Two examples, to which I will return throughout this Article, are
useful in understanding the theoretical concepts described thus far.
The default rule concerning consequential damages for breach of
contract created in Hadley v. Baxendale,20 an example much used by
17 See Ayres, supra note 3, at 1397; Cf. EATERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 34
("[G]orporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate
ventures can save the cost of contracting.").
18 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 93 ("[T]he majoritarian approach fails to
account for the possibly disparate costs of contracting and of failing to contract around
different defaults."); Charny, supra note 16, at 1842 (recognizing that "minimizing the
number of transactions in which parties bargain around the [default] rule will not always
minimize the cost of transacting").
19 Ian Ayres has drawn on this insight to argue for the possible efficiency of "muddy"
rather than clear default rules in the context of corporate contracting. Ayres, supra note 3,
at 1403-08. Ayres hypothesizes that some parties would prefer situation-specific (i.e.,
.muddy") default rules, such as a rule requiring a court to select the substantive rule that is
most "reasonable" given the parties' unique circumstances, while other parties would pre-
fer generic rules, applicable to all contracting parties regardless of circumstances, but clear
ex ante. Id. at 1405-06. Asserting (although offering no proof) that it might be more
expensive for a corporation to contract around a clear but generic default provision into a
muddy term than vice versa, Ayres contends that transaction costs could be minimized and
overall efficiency achieved in a regime of tailored "party-specific" defaults, even if a clear
term would be efficient for the majority of contracting parties. Id.
20 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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default rule theorists, 21 is that a party breaching a contract is liable
only for damages that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of con-
tracting.22 An obvious alternative rule would be to impose liability on
the breaching party for all damages proximately caused by the breach,
regardless of foreseeability. A majoritarian approach to default-rule
creation would ask whether, in a world with no transaction costs, most
contracting parties-or perhaps most contracting parties in a given
industry-would contract for full liability or limited liability (that is,
liability only for foreseeable damages) and then create the default
rule accordingly. If it is more costly for parties to contract for limited
liability than full liability (or vice versa), however, selecting the most
efficient rule would require taking into account that cost differential
in addition to the percentage of parties that would prefer each term.
The doctrine of impossibility presents another context for con-
trasting these two approaches. Under both the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and the UCC, the default contract term excuses from per-
formance a party who does not perform a contractual obligation be-
cause doing so would be commercially impracticable, or unreasonable
under the circumstances. 23  A contrary rule would hold the
21 Perhaps the most famous case in all of contract law, Hadley has become the exam-
ple that default rule theorists most often employ to illustrate their conceptual arguments.
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1 (using Hadley as a starting point for testing their
model of default rules); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 101-04, 108-18 (same); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of LiabilityforBreach of Contract: The
Rule ofHadley v. Baxendale, 7J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991) (studying the desirability of an
unlimited-liability rule); William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of In-
surance, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 252-60 (1983) (applying a "remoteness in damage" doctrine
to insurance theory); Johnston, supra note 3, at 615 (questioning the "established eco-
nomic analysis" of Hadley).
22 Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151. The Hadley decision has been cited with approval by
the highest court in 43 states. See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Dam-
ages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FoRDHAM L. R-v. 665, 665
n.3 (1994). There is considerable debate as to how the rule of Hadley is, and should be,
interpreted. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrS § 351(1) (1981) (limiting
damages to those that the breaching party had "reason to foresee as a probable result of the
breach when the contract was made") (emphasis added) with Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 563, 609-11 (1992) (noting with approval
that the trend in the United States and the United Kingdom is to relax the foreseeability
standard). For the purposes of this Article, it is only important that the rule of Hadley is a
rule of limited liability to some degree.
23 REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). According to § 261,
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impractica-
ble without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to
render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circum-
stances indicate the contrary.
Id.
Section 2-615(a) of the UCC explains that:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller... is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has
been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-oc-
616 [Vol. 83:608
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nonperforming party in breach of contract and, thus, liable for dam-
ages regardless of what circumstances led to the failure to perform.
The traditional majoritarian approach to default rule creation would
select the default rule that most parties would otherwise bargain for
absent transaction costs; a more subtle variation would also consider
whether it is more costly to contract into or out of an impossibility
excuse.
A determination of whether the traditional majoritarian ap-
proach or its variant will be superior for selecting efficient defaults
depends on the distribution of transaction costs among the parties
subject to the default rule. What is important for our purposes is to
recognize that the economic efficiency claims of both approaches rely
on the implicit assumptions that transaction costs are the primary
cause of contractual inefficiency, and that lawmakers' goal in setting
default rules for private contracts should be to minimize the efficiency
losses caused by transaction costs.
B. Strategic Bargaining
In the last decade, legal economists concerned with the effects of
strategic behavior on private contracting, have challenged the assump-
tion that the primary cause of inefficient contracts is transaction
costs.2 4 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have argued that, even when
transaction costs are low, parties might not bargain around an ineffi-
cient default rule if one or both parties possess private information.2 5
Their critical insight is that one party might prefer an inefficient con-
tractual provision if contracting around that provision would require
that party to reveal private information that the other party could ex-
currence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made
U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1995). The current state of the impossibility excuse is briefly explored
in Gerhard Wagner, In Defense of the Impossibility Defense, 27 Loy. U. Gin. LJ. 55, 58-60
(1995).
24 For an excellent review, synthesis, and critique of this literature as it applies to the
Rule of Hadley v. Baxenda!e see Eric A. Posner, Contract Remedies, Precaution, Causation, and
Mitigation, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOmIcs 3-11 (Edward Elson ed., forthcoming
1998).
25 Because their conclusions depend on the existence of imperfect information, Ayres
and Gertner's argument can be seen as an application of the Coase theorem. Their posi-
tion is similar to the traditionalist argument, if the Coase theorem is understood broadly as
requiring perfect information, as well as no friction in bargaining, in order to guarantee an
efficient allocation of resources by the market. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Me-
lamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 1089, 1095 (1972) (defining the Coase theorem's no-transaction-costs requirement
"as involving both perfect knowledge and the absence of any impediments or costs of nego-
tiating"); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental
Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 73 (1982) (stating that perfect knowledge of the other party's
utility function is an assumption of the Coase theorem).
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ploit to capture a larger share of the gains in trade from contracting.26
In the language of bargaining theory, each party to a bargain must
consider both how to create value for the parties jointly and claim that
value for himself.27 When the act of creating value permits the other
party to claim all of that value plus more, the rational bargainer will
prefer to do nothing.28
A contracting party may have an incentive to accept an inefficient
default term rather than attempt to contract around it if that party
possesses private information about its own unique characteristics that
could impose costs on the other party and that would be revealed if
that party attempted to bargain around the default term. An example
best illustrates this possibility. Consider the parties in Hadley v. Bax-
endak a mill owner shipping a broken crankshaft and a common car-
rier paid to deliver the crankshaft to the manufacturer for repair.2 9 If
the shipper (i.e., the mill owner) knows it will suffer unusually high
damages if delivery is untimely, it might be socially optimal for the
carrier to take special precautions, which are best assured if the par-
ties adopt a contract term making the carrier liable for all damages
resulting from nondelivery.3 0 The "reasonably foreseeable damages"
default rule of Hadley forces the shipper to bargain for the alternative
"full damages" contract term, and, by doing so, reveal that it would
suffer unusually high damages in the case of breach. It is efficient for
the shipper to reveal this information to the carrier because the infor-
mation allows the carrier to take added precaution.3l But the shipper
may not otherwise reveal the information because, if the carrier has
market power,32 the carrier can use its knowledge of the high value
the shipper places on prompt delivery to charge the shipper a higher
price for the delivery service.3 3 If the default rule placed liability for
all damages on the carrier, the shipper would have an incentive to
hide the private information about its potential damages in order to
26 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 99-100.
27 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES Y- SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETIvE GAIN 29-45 (1986) (explaining the "negotiator's di-
lemma" of balancing the need to create value with the need to claim value).
28 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 99 ("[R]evealing information might simultane-
ously increase the total size of the pie and decrease the share of the pie that the relatively
informed party receives. If the 'share-of-the-pie effect' dominates the 'size-of-the-pie ef-
fect,' informed parties might rationally choose to withhold relevant information.").
29 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
30 If the shipper can purchase third-party insurance for the unique damages it will
suffer in the event of nondelivery more cheaply than the carrier can avoid the usual risk of
nondelivery, the socially optimal action might be for the shipper to purchase insurance,
which is best assured by the use of a limited liability contract term.
31 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 101.
32 If the carrier is a price taker in a competitive market for shipping services, a differ-
ent analysis of the situation is required. SeeJohnston, supra note 3, at 625-31.
33 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 101-02.
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convince the carrier that it has a low value for the service, which could
aid the shipper in negotiating a lower price. Ignorant that the shipper
placed an unusually high value on timely delivery, however, the car-
rier would not take the socially optimal level of heightened precaution
to ensure delivery.
A similarly inefficient contract could result when the party fa-
vored by the default term has knowledge of the default rule while the
other party does not. Assume, for example, that: (1) the default rule
limits carriers' liability to foreseeable damages, (2) the carrier knows
this but the shipper (likely to be a less frequent participant in delivery
transactions) does not, and (3) the carrier is a better cost avoider (i.e.,
is in a better position to minimize damages caused by a breach of
contract) than the shipper. It would be efficient for the parties to
allocate the risk of all damages caused by breach to the carrier, but
the carrier might be better off taking advantage of the shipper's igno-
rance and charging the "full liability" price for its services while not
revealing that the shipper retains some of the risk under the applica-
ble default term.
To promote efficiency, Ayres and Gertner propose consciously
setting default rules to the disadvantage of the party likely to possess
important private information in an effort to induce that party to bar-
gain around the default term and, in so doing, reveal that private in-
formation.3 4 They call rules determined in this way "penalty
default[s]." 35 If the strategic problem in the Hadley example is that
shippers often have private information about their potential dam-
ages, a penalty default can be created by making the carrier liable only
for reasonably foreseeable damages. This should force a high-value
shipper to contract around the default rule by requesting that the car-
rier assume more liability, which implicitly reveals that the shipper
risks greater than average damages and should induce the carrier to
take the optimal level of precaution.3 6 If the strategic problem in
Hadley is that shippers are often uninformed about default terms in
shipping contracts, a penalty default can be created by assigning all
liability to the carriers. A full-liability rule would force carriers to bar-
gain for limited-liability terms when doing so would be efficient and
34 Id. at 94, 97-100; see also Ayres, supra note 3, at 1398 ("Hypothetical defaults are
designed to allow [parties] to avoid explicit contracting, while penalty defaults are
designed to induce explicit contracting."); Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 21 (comparing
the impact of both limited-liability and unlimited-liability rules on communication
equilibria).
35 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 91.
36 See Doug Carleton, Note, Averting the New Business' Battle to Prove Lost Profits: A Rein-
troduction of the Traditional Reasonable Certainty Rule as Penalty Default, 67 S. CAT- L. REv.
1573, 1591-92 (1994) (suggesting a default rule that nonbreaching parties to a contract not
be entitled to lost profits as damages, thus forcing parties to reveal ex ante information
about their likely losses in an effort to bargain for a lost profits term).
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would educate the shipper about the default terms.37 In contrast to
majoritarian defaults, which mimic the terms that parties would con-
tract for in a world without transaction costs, penalty defaults exem-
plify the other common law-and-economics approach to overcoming
market imperfections: assigning rights so as to facilitate the efficient
allocation of rights by private parties.38
The concept of penalty default rules has received much attention
because it forces lawmakers to consider a different cause of inefficient
contracting than the conventional wisdom assumes. If left to their
own devices, parties might fail to contract around inefficient default
rules not only because of high transaction costs, but also because stra-
tegic incentives pit the collective interests of the parties against the
interests of each individual party. Assuming that the costs of default
rules are limited to the transaction costs of parties bargaining around
the default and the inefficiencies created when strategic concerns
cause parties not to contract around otherwise inefficient default
rules, penalty defaults are more efficient than majoritarian defaults
when the costs of the latter exceed those of the former.39
The argument for penalty defaults assumes that parties with pri-
vate information might not contract around inefficient default terms
because suggesting an alternative term could weaken their bargaining
positions by revealing either the content of the default term or how
important an alternative term is to them. But the possibility that stra-
tegic behavior could cause parties to accept inefficient default terms is
still broader; a party also may not wish to bargain around certain de-
fault terms when doing so might be seen as a signal of an undesirable
characteristic not directly related to the proposed alternative term.40
For example, the carrier in Hadley might not attempt to bargain
around a full-liability default term even when the shipper is the more
efficient risk-bearer because the shipper might see the carrier's action
as a signal that it is unreliable and may therefore negligently fail to
deliver on time more often than the shipper previously assumed.41 In
37 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 98 (arguing that when one party is relatively
uninformed about the default rule, the default should be set against the informed party).
38 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
39 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 112-15.
40 See generallyJohnston, supra note 3, at 616 (arguing that the majority rule in Hadley
is at odds with the normal strategic incentives of average parties).
41 Johnston uses a contrary example: given certain assumptions, subjects might have
more difficulty bargaining around a limited-liability default term than an unlimited-liability
default term. Johnston, supra note 3, at 630-31. He claims that his example suggests ex-
pansive default rules which are superior to narrow ones, id., but, as my example indicates,
that conclusion is not necessarily correct-everything depends on the particular facts.
Johnston's more general point, though, that the desire to send certain signals can cause
parties to decide that it is strategically sensible to accede to inefficient default terms rather
than to attempt to contract around them, id. at 617, is certainly correct.
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such a situation, a party must balance the desire to create a more effi-
cient contract with the risk that an attempt to do so could cost it the
deal.
Even the very act of bargaining around contract default rules-
irrespective of the substance of the default term-might send the sig-
nal that the party is a contentious trading partner who is excessively
concerned with the legal rights delineated in the contract and is likely
to be litigious in the event of a dispute.42 This implication could
cause the other party to demand concessions in return for the per-
ceived higher risk of conflict or to shy away from the contract alto-
gether. If the contract at issue involves a long-term relationship, such
a signal could be even more detrimental to the party seeking to con-
tract around the default term.43 All of these possibilities exemplify
the basic point that contracting parties might strategically decide to
accept inefficient default terms rather than contract around them,
even when the transaction costs of contracting around the default
terms are very low.
C. The Limited Importance of Default Rules
Both the transaction-cost and strategic-behavior based theories of
contract default rules imply that, regardless of how important the con-
tent of default rules might be, there are certain circumstances in
which the choice of default rules does not matter at all. Under any of
the analytical approaches described above, if transaction costs are low
and neither party possesses private information, the choice of default
rule has little to no practical significance.44 In such circumstances,
economic analysis suggests that the parties should arrive at the same
contractual risk allocations, either explicitly (by contracting around
the default rules) or implicitly, (by choosing not to contract around
the defaults) regardless of the content of the default terms.
If relational considerations are incorporated into any of the law-
and-economics approaches, the choice of default rules might matter
in even fewer circumstances; that is, even when parties fail to contract
around an inefficient default rule because of high transaction costs or
42 See Lisa Bernstein, Comment, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. C. IN-
TEreDsc. L.J. 59, 70-71 (1993). Bernstein refers to these problems as the "relational costs of
contracting around default rules." I. at 72-73.
43 Bernstein observes that some industries set their own transactional default rules
that include provisions for mandatory arbitration. Id at 84-87. In such industries, attempt-
ing to contract out of mandatory arbitration might send a loud signal of likely intransi-
gence in the event of conflict, which would, in turn, provide a strong incentive to parties to
avoid contracting around the arbitration default, no matter how inefficient.
44 Easterbrook and Fischel's discussion of whether the choice between a limited and
full liability rule for corporations matters if corporations are free to contract around the
rule suggests that: "[t]he answer is yes, but probably not much." Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 89, 102 (1985).
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strategic behavior, and a contingency arises that invokes the default
term, the substance of the default rule still will not govern the parties'
relationship in many instances. This is because parties that have a
mutually beneficial ongoing relationship may choose to ignore the de-
fault rule when they allocate losses after contingencies arise in order
to preserve the relationship.
Suppose, for example, that: (1) the applicable default rule would
hold the carrier in Hadley liable only for reasonably foreseeable dam-
ages in the event of breach, (2) the carrier negligently fails to deliver
the crankshaft on time, and (3) the shipper then reveals that he con-
sequently suffered considerable damages, the magnitude of which
were unforeseeable by the carrier at the time of contracting. If the
shipper seeks compensation for its full damages, the carrier is legally
entitled to refuse and to compensate the shipper only for the foresee-
able damages. But if the carrier values its continuing relationship
with the shipper, it might be inclined to pay the shipper its full dam-
ages, effectively waiving its right to the limited liability it enjoyed
under the default rule.4 Of course, the likelihood that the carrier
would waive its default right following the occurrence of an unex-
pected contingency is a function of the severity of the shipper's dam-
ages and the value to the carrier of the ongoing relationship. The
important point, though, is that in many cases the default rule is likely
to be irrelevant even when one of the parties could invoke the rule to
its benefit. The analysis is essentially identical in a scenario in which
the default term is contrary to the Hadley rule. If the shipper reveals
unforeseen substantial damages following a breach, the carrier might
choose to negotiate an allocation of these damages with the shipper
rather than litigate, even if the default rule provides it with a right to
full compensation. In ongoing or repeat relationships, then, parties
might often ignore default rules in an effort to reach a mutually satis-
factory accommodation.
This analysis can extend even to single transactions in which par-
ties have no history of past dealings and are unlikely to desire future
dealings. To the extent that the Hadley carrier values its reputation
with other shippers, or that the shipper values its reputation with
other carriers, the parties might choose to negotiate a mutually-agree-
45 Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Of Goase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986) (documenting how rural neighbors with ongo-
ing relationships ignore formal legal rules and resolve disputes based on community
norms); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLuM. L. Ruv. 997, 1080
(1992) ("Norms of sharing and cooperation... turn out to make good economic sense.").
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able allocation of losses rather than enforce the legal rights provided
by default rules. 46
Economic analysis thus suggests that default rules matter in only a
subset of the total number of contractual relationships. If transaction
costs are low and information is distributed symmetrically between the
parties, they will negotiate efficient contracts regardless of the content
of default rules. Even when these assumptions do not hold and par-
ties fail to contract around inefficient defaults ex ante, if a contin-
gency arises that invokes the substance of the default rule, the parties
might well choose to ignore that substance if preserving the relation-
ship with the other party or protecting their reputation with similarly
situated parties is more important than the advantage that can be ob-
tained by invoking the rights that the default rule provides.
D. The Implicit Preference-Exogeneity Assumption
Despite their differences, all of the economic theories of contract
default rules share an implicit but fundamental assumption: con-
tracting parties' preferences for contract terms are exogenous to the
content of the default terms that will govern the parties by operation
of law if the parties do not contract around them. According to eco-
nomic analysis, many factors might affect how much the Hadley ship-
per would prefer a full-liability contractual provision to a limited-
liability provision: the damages it would suffer if the carrier failed to
make a timely delivery, the cost of purchasing third-party insurance to
cover future losses, the amount of precaution the carrier customarily
takes, and so forth. One factor that will not affect the strength of its
preference, however, is the content of the default liability term.47 Ob-
viously, the shipper will prefer full liability over limited liability, but it
will not value a full-liability term any more or less if the default term is
ful-liability than if it is limited liability. The carrier will prefer limited
46 Cf HiLLMAN, supra note 10, at 235 (pointing out that some theorists argue that the
desire to maintain a good reputation and avoid contract breakdown matter more to busi-
ness parties than contract law).
47 At least one commentator has suggested that the content of contract default rules
can change the preferences of contracting parties over time by stamping the imprimatur of
the legal system on certain substantive rules. See Charny, supra note 16, at 1879 ("[I]n
some instances, application of the rule will persuade parties that it is correct.. .. "). This
argument is a specific application of the broader contention that the content of the law can
change preferences over time. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production The-
ory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 669, 695 (1979) (noting that
"[p]erhaps society learns what to value in part through the legal system's descriptions of
our protected spheres"); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. Rnv.
903, 933-39 (1996) (noting that choices are affected by social norms). Although they bear
similarities, these arguments differ from the argument advanced in this Article: that con-
tract default rules affect preferences, not because the law places its imprimatur on certain




liability, but the strength of its preference will similarly be unaffected
by the substance of the default term.
It is easy to see why economic theories of default rules need the
preference-exogeneity assumption. If the selection of a default term
can cause parties' preferences for substantive contract provisions to
shift, the question of which possible default rule is optimal takes on an
additional dimension of complexity: lawmakers must anticipate the ef-
fect of such preference shifts on the bargaining dynamics between the
contracting parties as well as the effects of transaction costs and strate-
gic behavior.
Why theorists make the implicit assumption of preference ex-
ogeneity is somewhat less obvious-they do not offer any empirical
evidence to support the proposition. The reason is embedded deeply
in the behavioral model of rational-choice theory, which underlies
economic analysis of law.48 Rational-choice theory presumes parties
will act to maximize their expected utility. To effect this maximiza-
tion, parties must compare end states that might result from alterna-
tive behaviors discounted by their likelihood of not occurring.49 The
economic analysis of law usually simplifies this calculation by assuming
that parties will act to maximize their expected wealth.50 Under the
standard application of this theory, we would expect the shipper in
Hadley to compare its expected costs of the carrier's negligent failure
to deliver the crankshaft in a timely fashion under both allocations of
liability, and to value a full-liability contractual regime over a limited-
liability rule at the difference between those two costs.5 ' The carrier
should make the opposite calculation, computing the value it places
on a world in which the carrier assumes limited liability and compar-
ing this to the value of a world of full liability. Absent transaction costs
and strategic behavior, both parties are better off adopting the rule
48 Cf Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, L. & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 487, 487-91 (1994) (book review) (discussing the reasons for the law-and-economics
movement's devotion to rational choice theory).
49 The focus on end states gives rise to the "invariance" principle, which holds that an
individual given a choice of options should prefer the same option regardless of the form
in which the choice is presented. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S253 (1986) (stating that invariance is
"[a] n essential condition for a theory of choice that claims normative status"). The prefer-
ence-exogeneity assumption follows from the invariance principle: a cosfiess choice be-
tween two options should not be affected by which of the options is the default.
50 See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 13, at 118 (noting that "wealth maximization is the
preferred collective goal for the legal economists"); PosNER, supra note 14, at 12 (stating
that value is measured by willingness to pay); cf. DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SiiARO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY- A CRITIQUE OF APPLIcATONS IN POLrCAL SCi-
ENCE 95-99 (1994) (criticizing law-and-economics for its rationality assumptions).
51 Cf Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTRDisc. LJ. 43,
50-51 (1993) (criticizing the standard default rules paradigm for assuming that rational,
self-interested parties only engage in cost-benefit analysis).
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favored by the party with the stronger preference, with the parties
sharing the surplus value that results by means of a side payment of
money or other favors.52 Whether the default term provides for full
or limited liability, however, has no impact on which party is the bet-
ter risk-avoider or risk-bearer and thus can more efficiently bear the
risk of losses, thereby creating a cooperative surplus for the parties to
divide. Accordingly, the paradigm of rational choice suggests that the
content of the applicable default rule should be irrelevant to deter-
mining whether, or to what extent, a contracting party prefers a con-
tract term.
II
THE T ~oRErcCAL CRrTQUE
A. Evidence of the Status Quo Bias
The analytical power of rational-choice theory makes the prefer-
ence-exogeneity assumption attractive, but there is a significant body
of empirical and experimental data that, while not precisely on point,
at least suggests that the assumption might be false. Two closely-re-
lated sets of empirical findings are relevant. The first, known alterna-
tively as the "endowment effect ' 53 or the "offer-asking" gap,54 is that
individuals will often place a higher value on an entitlement if they
own it than if they do not.55 The second, referred to as the status quo
bias, is that people systematically favor maintaining a state of affairs
that they perceive as being the status quo rather than switching to an
alternative state, all else being equal.56 This Section will review the
52 By adopting the contract term preferred by the party with the stronger preference,
and with the benefiting party making a side payment to the nonbenefiting party, the
adopted term becomes "Pareto efficient," meaning that at least one party is made better off
and neither are worse off than they would have been under the possible alternative term.
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND EcoNoMics 12 (1988).
53 See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theoy of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (coining the term "endowment effect").
54 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REv. 387, 401 (1981) (referring to the "offer-asking problem"); Russell Korobkin,
Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theoy of Efficient Entitlement Allo-
cation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 663, 664-65 (1994) (calling the gap between "what someone is
willing to pay (WTP) for an entitlement she does not own and what she is willing to accept
(WTA) in return for giving up the same entitlement if she owns it" the "offer/asking price
gap").
55 Most demonstrations of the endowment effect use consumer goods as entitlements.
Seesources cited inftanotes 71-81 and accompanying text. Some experiments have demon-
strated the endowment effect using legal property rights, usually rights to environmental
commodities or preservation, as entitlements. See, e.g., infra notes 82-88 and accompanying
text.
56 See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, 1 J. RisK & UNCERTAnry 7, 8 (1988) ("Faced with new options, decisionmakers often
stick with the status quo alternative, for example, to follow customary company policy, to
1998]
CORNELL LAW REVEW
relevant literature, 57 and the following Section will consider the simi-
larities and differences between the content of experiments that have
demonstrated the status quo bias and endowment effects, and the
unique and unexplored relationship between the status quo and con-
tract default rules.58
A series of controlled questionnaire experiments by William Sam-
uelson and Richard Zeckhauser using undergraduate and graduate
students as subjects illustrates the positive relationship between the
status quo and individual preferences.59 In each experiment, the au-
thors provided subjects with several options, asking each subject to
select one.60 The subjects were randomly subdivided into smaller
groups, each of which received a different description of the state of
the world that either revealed that one of the options represented the
"status quo" position or that none of the options represented the sta-
tus quo.61 As they hypothesized, the authors found that the subjects
generally preferred a given choice most often when it represented the
status quo and least often when another choice represented the status
quo, with preferences for the choice falling somewhere in between
when none of the options given would preserve the status quo.6 2
In one test, the authors presented subjects with four investment
options, each with a different risk profile-a high-risk stock, a moder-
ate-risk stock, a treasury bill, and a municipal bond-from which they
elect an incumbent to still another term in office, to purchase the same product brands, or
to stay in the same job.").
57 The literature is reviewed in substantially more detail in Elizabeth Hoffman & Mat-
thew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993).
58 Unfortunately for the sake of clarity, neither the behavioral decision theory litera-
ture nor the legal literature applying it differentiates in any consistent way the various
terms used to describe the basic phenomenon. Most of the research on the phenomenon
uses "endowment effect" and "status quo bias" interchangeably. See, e.g., Maya Bar-Hillel &
Efrat Neter, Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets?, 70 J. PERSONAr & Soc.
PSYCHOL 17, 17 (1996) ("Reluctance to trade has previously been studied under the label,
of the endowment effect, [and] the status quo bias.. . .") (citations omitted); see also EdwardJ.
McCaffery et al., Framing the jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and SufferingAwards, 81 VA. L.
REv. 1341, 1351 (1995) ("The central relevant body of cognitive decision theory research
... has been variously termed the 'endowment effect[ ]' [or] the 'status quo bias' .... ).
But see Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL SruD. 217,
230 (1993) (calling the endowment effect a "narrower phenomenon" than the status quo
bias). I have chosen to emphasize status quo bias in this Article because contract default
rules do not create endowments, at least as the term is conventionally understood, see infra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text, although they do engender a bias in favor of the term
perceived as the status quo.
59 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 56. The 486 subjects were MBA students and
senior business majors at Boston University and public policy students at the Harvard Uni-
versity's Kennedy School of Government. See id. at 14.
60 See id. at 12-13.
61 See id. at 12-14.
62 See id. at 14.
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had to choose one in which to invest a sum of money.63 Subjects in
one subgroup were told only that they had recently inherited money
that they now needed to invest-the neutral frame. 64 The others were
told that they had inherited a portfolio, most of which was invested in
one of the four choices, and they had to decide whether to leave it
there or switch to one of the other choices (with zero transaction costs
of switching).65 Subjects selected each of the options most often when
it was the status quo investment and least often when one of the other
choices was the status quo investment.66 Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky demonstrated the same effect when they asked students to im-
agine that they held one of two hypothetical jobs, the first with a
higher salary and the second with better working conditions, and to
decide whether they would prefer to stay in their current position or
switch. 67 Regardless of the job to which they were hypothetically as-
signed, most subjects chose to remain at that job rather than -trade
employment opportunities.68
Experimenters have observed similar results in contexts more
personally relevant to the experimental subjects. One survey asked
customers of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company who had exper-
ienced different levels of service reliability to describe how much
money they would be willing to pay ('WTP" value) for increased relia-
bility and what amount of money they would be willing to accept
('CWTA" value) for reductions in reliability.69 The authors found that
for any given service level, customers' WTA values exceeded their
WTP values by a magnitude of four to one, signifying an extreme bias
in favor of the status quo level of service reliability, regardless of the
level of reliability."
Scholars have empirically demonstrated the powerful pull of the
status quo not only in hypothetical choice situations, but also in cir-
cumstances where subjects are forced to place monetary values on
goods and receive compensation on the basis of their valuations. In a
now famous series of studies conducted by Daniel Kahneman, Jack
Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, the experimenters randomly endowed
subjects with either a coffee mug or six dollars.7 ' "Mug owners" were
63 See id. at 12-13.
64 See id. at 12.
65 See id. at 12-13.
66 See id, at 17 tbl.lc.
67 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIr 341, 348 (1984).
68 See id.
69 See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 QJ.
EcoN. 141, 143 (1991).
70 See id. at 144.
71 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Goase Theo-
rem, 98 J. POL ECON. 1325, 1330 (1990).
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asked to reveal the minimum amount they would be willing to accept
to sell the mug ("WTA" value), while the cash holders were asked to
reveal the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for one of
the mugs ('WTP" value). 72 Subjects were told that the experimenters
would calculate the market-clearing price for the mugs based on the
WTA and WTP data elicited and execute trades between the mug
holders who preferred the cash market value of the mugs and cash
holders who preferred the mug to dollars at that price. 73 If initial
ownership (or initial endowments) did not affect preferences for the
mugs, approximately fifty percent of the mugs would trade hands in
this setting because there was no reason to think that subjects in one
group were more fond of mugs than were subjects in the other group.
The experimenters found, however, that mug owners valued the mugs
roughly twice as high as cash holders and very few trades took place.74
Results did not change substantially when subjects participated in
multiple iterations of the experiment to permit them to benefit from
learning about how the market operated.75
In a similar set of experiments, Jack Knetsch andJ.A. Sinden gave
some subjects a ticket for a lottery with a fifty dollar cash prize and
others three dollars in cash, and then offered to buy the ticket hold-
ers' tickets for three dollars and to sell tickets to the cash holders for
three dollars.76 Eighty-two percent of the ticket holders kept their
tickets while only thirty-eight percent of the cash holders purchased a
ticket, implying that those endowed with tickets placed a higher value
on the tickets than those endowed with cash.77
Experimenters have replicated these results in numerous other
studies using relatively inexpensive consumer goods,78 and they have
observed similar results in real-world quasi-experiments where individ-
uals had more personal wealth at risk. In one notable example, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania both passed laws in the 1980s giving consum-
ers the choice of a cheaper automobile insurance policy with limited
rights to sue, or a more expensive policy with more expansive legal
72 See id. at 1330-31.
73 See id. at 1331.
74 Mug holders revealed a median IATrA value of $5.25, while cash holders revealed
WTP values of $2.25-2.75 in different trials. See id. at 1332 tbl.2.
75 See id. at 1332. In a trial with 44 subjects playing 4 iterations of the game, the
number of trades executed in each successive iteration were 4, 1, 2, and 2. See id. at 1332
tbl.2.
76 Jack L. Knetsch &J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experi-
mental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 QJ. ECON. 507, 512 (1984).
77 See id. at 513.




rights. 79 In NewJersey, the default policy is the limited-rights policy-
drivers must specifically request an expanded-rights policy-while the
opposite is true in Pennsylvania. 0 Various reports at different times
have concluded that a large majority of New Jersey drivers own lim-
ited-rights policies, while a large majority of Pennsylvania drivers own
expanded-rights policies,8' despite the absence of any obvious reason
why residents of the two states would have substantially different tastes
in insurance.
Although most of the experimental work documents the status
quo bias in the context of consumer goods or other individually-
owned entitlements, many of which can be physically held in the
owner's hand, studies also provide evidence that individuals value less
tangible property rights in a similar way. These studies often base
their findings on survey data and usually focus on environmental re-
sources.82 In one study, for example, residents of the four-corners re-
gion of the southwestern United States were asked to value an
entitlement to air quality.83 Approximately one-half of the subjects
were told that a factory had the legal right to emit pollution into the
atmosphere that would decrease average visibility in the area from sev-
enty-five miles to fifty miles.84 The experimenters told the other one-
half of the subjects that the factory wanted to emit the pollution, but
that the residents had the legal right to block its operation.8 5 The first
group of subjects reported that it was willing to pay an average of
$4.75 per family per month to keep the factory from opening, whereas
the second group demanded an average of $24.47 per family per
month before it would permit the factory to begin operation.8 6 If pos-
session of the legal right did not affect the residents' valuations of
clean air, the monetary valuations expressed by both groups should
have been identical-it should not have mattered that subjects in one
condition were asked for their WTP values while subjects in the other
condition were asked for their WTA values.87 Similar studies have
79 The story is told in, among other places, David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial




82 See, e.g., id. at 74344 (reporting data from various studies of subjects' valuations of
environmental resources).
83 See Robert D. Rowe et al., An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility, 7J. ENvrL.
ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1980).
84 See id. at 8-9.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 10 tbl.2.
87 It bears mentioning that evidence of an endowment effect for environmental rights
is sometimes questioned on methodological grounds. In such survey experiments, subjects
might have believed that they had strategic incentives to understate their WTP values and
overstate their WIA values while believing, conversely, that they had no incentive to reveal
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demonstrated that the value that environmentalists and hunters place
on keeping their favorite pristine areas undeveloped can vary by or-
ders of magnitude depending on whether the respondents have the
right to prohibit development or developers have the right to build.88
In many circumstances, it seems that "whether people have a prefer-
ence for a good, a right, or anything else is often in part a function of
whether the government, or the law, has allocated it to them in the
first instance."8 9
B. Is the Status Quo Bias Applicable to Contract Default Rules?
The body of behavioral science literature discussed above
powerfully demonstrates that, in at least some contexts, preferences
can depend on how a decisionmaker perceives options relative to the
status quo. This insight suggests that the preference exogeneity as-
sumption of the law-and-economics literature on contract default
their true valuations. Residents of the four-corners region, for example, might have be-
lieved that their valuations could be used to determine the price taxpayers would pay the
factory not to operate or, alternatively, would be paid by the factory to operate. If so, they
could effectively "game" the survey by artificially deflating their WIT values and inflating
their WTA values. Some subjects may have also misunderstood that they were to reveal
their maximum WITP or their minimum WTA. Those asked for their WTP might have re-
sponded to the surveys like "buyers" of goods normally do-by starting low and increasing
their bids only after negotiations. For the same reason, those asked for their WTA values
might have started high, as "sellers" are conditioned to do.
88 See, e.g., JUDD HAMMACK & GARDNER MAL.ARD BRowN, JR., WATERFOWL AND WET-
LANDS: ToWARD BIoEcoNoMic ANALYSIS 24-40 (1974) (discussing waterfowl hunters' valua-
tion of a wetland); WILLIAM F. SINCLAIR, 5 KEMANo II ENVRONMENTAL STUDIES: THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACr OF THE KEMANO II HYDROELEarmIC PROJECr ON BRmiSH CO-
LUMBIA'S FISHERIES RESOURCES (1976) (discussing fishermen's valuation of a fishing area);
Nancy D. Banford et al., Feasibility Judgements and Alternative Measures of Benefits and Costs, 11
J. Bus. ADMIN. 25, 29-32 (1980) (studying the valuation of fishing pier); Rebecca R. Boyce
et al., An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of the WTA-WTP Disparity, 82
Am. ECON. Rxv. 1366, 1366 (1992) (reporting that WlCA values exceed WTP values for
environmental commodities by anywhere from two to more than ten times, depending on
the study); David S. Brookshire et al., Valuing Increments and Decrements in Natural Resource
Service Flows, 62 Am. J. AGRic. ECON. 478, 482-87 (1980) (discussing valuation of the oppor-
tunity to hunt elk); William D. Schulze et al., ValuingEnvironmental Commodities: Some Recent
Experiments, 57 LAND ECON. 151, 165-67 (1981) (noting hunters' and wildlife observers'
valuation of "wildlife experiences").
89 Sunstein, supra note 58, at 273-24. The endowment effect has been demonstrated
even when individuals are given counterfactuals that ask them to imagine a different allo-
cation of rights, rather than merely learning there is a different allocation of rights. In a
recent study, Edward McCaffery, Daniel Kahneman, and Matthew Spitzer found that exper-
imental subjects playing the role ofjurors in hypothetical lawsuits awarded plaintiffs higher
'pain and suffering" damages when they were instructed to determine the award by consid-
ering the amount a plaintiff should be paid pre-accident to consent to the accident than
when they were instructed to determine how much the plaintiff should be paid post-accident
to be "made whole." McCaffery et al., supra note 58, at 1354-72. This difference suggests
not only that a higher value is placed on physical well-being when it is enjoyed than when it
is not enjoyed, but that a higher value might be placed on physical well-being even when it
is not enjoyed if decisionmakers consider its value from a counterfactual perspective.
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rules might be empirically false. Just as individuals appear to place a
higher value on investment instruments, mugs, and lottery tickets
when they possess those items than when they do not, contracting par-
ties might place a higher value on the contract term governing conse-
quential damages for breach, or the existence of an impossibility
excuse, if they perceive the rule to represent the status quo than if
they perceive it to represent a change from the status quo. Thus, the
default term that governs the parties might appear to parties to represent
the status quo allocation of rights and responsibilities.
Whether the content of contract default rules might affect prefer-
ences in the same way ownership of a mug might is a question the
contracts literature has raised,90 but it has never been subject to thor-
ough empirical testing.91 Although this fact alone suggests a need for
more research, there is a solid theoretical reason to believe that pref-
erences for contract terms might not be affected by default rules, de-
spite the wealth of experimental data demonstrating the status quo
bias in other contexts. The reason is that contract default rules do not
provide contracting parties with vested entitlements in the way that
allocations of mugs, jobs, financial instruments, or property rights in
environmental resources do. Rather, the benefit that one party might
derive from a contract default rule hinges on an independent party
agreeing both to enter into a contract and to accept the default term.
The highly contingent nature of contract default rules means that
such rules do not provide actual endowments, but only what might be
termed "illusory endowments." Their illusory nature might prevent
parties from viewing such "endowments" as part of the status quo
when negotiating contracts.92 For example, although common carri-
90 See Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-SellerRelationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 390 (1991):
Even if the framing hypothesis is valid, substantial questions remain con-
cerning what point of reference consumers would choose ... if they are
influenced by framing effects at all. For example, if the law says that all
contracts will include an implied warranty unless explicitly disclaimed,
would consumers treat the implied warranty as something they already own
and consequently place a higher value on it? Or would they treat it as
something they have not yet acquired and never will acquire unless they
choose to buy the underlying product, thereby giving it the lower value
appropriate to things that are not yet theirs?
M; see also Charny, supra note 16, at 1867-68 (noting "suggestive evidence" for the claim
that parties' preferences "are influenced by the rule that the court adopts").
91 The question has been tested once, as part of a series of experiments. See Stewart
Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17J. LEcAL STUD. 237 (1988). For a
detailed discussion of this experiment, see infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
92 Cf CAss R- SuusrEm, BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF LAW (ChicagoJohn M. Olin Working
Paper in Law and Economics No. 46, 2d series 1997). Sunstein notes that:
People are averse to losses, but whether an event "codes" as a loss or a gain
depends not on simple facts but on a range of contextual factors, including
how the event is framed. The status quo is usually the reference point ....
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ers stand to benefit from the Hadley rule that limits liability for conse-
quential damages resulting from breach, carriers might not view a
limited-liability term as part of the status quo at the time of contract
negotiations because the potential benefits of the default rule cannot
vest prior to contract formation. If a carrier cannot reach an agree-
ment with a shipper, then the limited-liability default rule is of no use
to it.
Because no party can capture any benefit from a contract-default
rule unless and until the other party agrees to a contract that does not
override the default term, benefits that flow to one party from the
substantive content of a contract rule are a type of cooperative surplus
created by the parties' acting in concert. If it is more efficient for
parties to contract around a default term than to accept it, they can
create a largerjoint surplus by doing so than by not doing so. Regard-
less of whether the default term or an alternative is more efficient,
how parties divide the joint surplus created by the contract logically
should depend on their bargaining leverage and skill, not the content
of the default rule. Consequently, a plausible hypothesis is that con-
tracting parties will agree to the same contract term (the most effi-
cient one) regardless of the default rule.93 If this hypothesis is
correct, then preferences for contract terms might be exogenous to
the substance of the applicable default rules, as economic analysts of
default rules implicitly assume.
The argument that the status quo bias might not operate in the
realm of contract default rules is buttressed by the only experiment of
which I am aware that bears on the question. A decade ago, Stewart
Schwab conducted a bargaining experiment in which teams of stu-
dents negotiated a collective bargaining agreement, one-half repre-
senting management and one-half representing a labor union.94
Among the contract provisions at issue in the negotiation was whether
management would have the right to unilaterally relocate work to its
The most important source of reference point is the law-where has
the legal system placed the initial entitlement?
Id. at 6-7.
93 Some law-and-economics scholars have predicted that, for this reason, the choice of
default rules will not only have no effect on which term is ultimately agreed upon, but it
will also have no effect on how the joint surplus is divided. See Schwab, supra note 91, at
240; cf. Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 22
(1972) (arguing that "when there is no restriction on contracting, a change in the rule of
liability need not be accompanied by wealth redistribution"). Because the experimental
scenarios described in this Article are designed to measure only the absolute preferences
of contracting parties, not how they would divide a cooperative surplus through bargain-
ing, they do not address this issue.
94 Schwab, supra note 91, at 246-64. Schwab noted that experimental tests of whether
the initial allocation of property rights in a world without transaction costs had efficiency
implications do not necessarily bear on the question of whether the allocation of contract
presumptions (i.e., default terms) has efficiency implications. IM. at 238.
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nonunion plants.95 Each negotiator was provided a "preference
sheet" explicitly stating the number of "points" a negotiator would re-
ceive if certain terms were included in or excluded from the con-
tract.96 For one-half of the negotiating teams, the union negotiator
would receive three hundred points for including a clause prohibiting
relocation in the contract, while the management negotiator would
receive only two hundred points for keeping such a clause out of the
contract; the other half of the teams faced the opposite preference
distribution.97 Within each group, one-half of the negotiating teams
learned that the default rule was that management could relocate
work, while the other half learned that the default rule was that man-
agement could not.98
If the preference exogeneity assumption is correct, then the ulti-
mate resolution of the relocation issue reached by Schwab's subjects
in their contracts should not have differed depending on the default
rule to which they were exposed. His results provide modest support
for this prediction. Negotiating teams included a relocation clause in
their contracts slightly more often when the default rule favored
(rather than opposed) relocation, suggesting a potential weakness in
the preference-exogeneity assumption, but the difference was not sta-
tistically significant.99 It is possible, though, that the failure of
Schwab's experiment to detect a significant status quo bias is an arti-
fact of his experimental design-the experiment, unlike real life, left
no uncertainty as to the ex post consequences to the negotiating par-
ties of agreeing to or rejecting a relocation clause. 100 This Article con-
siders in detail below why this might have affected Schwab's results.101
in
THE EXPERImENTAL INQuiRY
A. The Experimental Design and Controls
In spite of the strong evidence that a status quo bias does exist in
some contexts, then, the question of whether the preference-ex-
95 See id. at 249.
96 See id. at 247. The points were then factored into the grade which students earned
for class participation. See id
97 See id. at 249.
98 See id-
99 See id at 252-54. 57.4% of teams facing a prorelocation default negotiated for a
relocation clause, while 51.9% of teams facing an antirelocation default negotiated for a
relocation clause. X2 = .149. See i&. at 253 tbl.3.
100 In a different article, Schwab apparently concedes the artificiality of the ex post
certainty of payoffs to subjects engaged in this negotiation simulation. Schwab, supra note
9, at 278 (explaining that a relocation clause is "essentially an insurance clause" and that
"[b]ecause insurance clauses are predicated on future uncertainty, bargaining with perfect
information is impossible").
101 See infra text accompanying notes 207-13.
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ogeneity assumption of default rule analysis is warranted remains un-
resolved. Moreover, because this question implicates how lawmakers
should approach the question of default rule creation, the resolution
of this question is fairly important. To address this issue, I conducted
a series of three controlled experiments designed to test the hypothe-
sis that preferences for contract terms depend on the substance of the
relevant default terms. The results strongly support the hypothesis.
Subjects for the experiments were 151 students at the University
of Illinois College of Law nearing completion of their first year of law
school, all of whom had completed a basic course in contract law the
previous fall semester.10 2 The students were recruited from each of
the three sections of the first-year class and received no compensation
for their participation. Students were requested to spend approxi-
mately fifteen minutes completing a survey for a research study in
which they would be asked to play the role of a lawyer and provide
advice to a client on the negotiation of a commercial contract. 10 3
Although the students were told their participation was not required,
the participation rate in each section approached one hundred per-
cent of those students present on the days when the experiment was
conducted.
Each subject was provided the following background information
about their client, the content of the contract negotiation, and their
objectives:
You represent a company called "NextDay" that specializes in
overnight delivery of packages (similar to Federal Express).
NextDay has reached an agreement in principle to provide shipping
services for a company called "Gifts, Inc." (which markets gifts by
catalog and ships orders overnight around the country) for a fixed
per-package charge, regardless of the size, value, or destination of
the package. The company that handled Gifts, Inc.'s shipping last
year charged it $20 per package; the price that Gifts, Inc. will pay
NextDay has not yet been finalized.
You are currently engaged in negotiations with Gifts, Inc. over
certain provisions of the contract. NextDay's management has
asked you to provide recommendations concerning certain issues
that have arisen and will almost certainly rely on your advice. At the
end of the year, NextDay will review how it fared under the contract
you negotiate and decide whether to retain you as their attorney in
future dealings, so you have a strong personal stake in making sure
that the contract serves the needs of NextDay and reflects well on
your judgment and ability.10 4
102 At the University of Illinois, Contracts is a one semester course taught in the fall.
Students participated in the experiments in April of their first year of law school.
103 For the complete survey instructions, see infra Appendix Al.
104 See infra Appendix A2.
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Subjects were then presented with three self-contained factual
scenarios, each describing a different issue in the contract negotia-
tions between NextDay and Gifts, Inc., followed by a series of ques-
tions designed to measure the subject's preference for a particular
contract term. 0 5 There were three to six different conditions for
each scenario, with differences between conditions designed to test
whether the applicable default rule affected subjects' preferences for
the contract term at issue.10 6 The order in which the scenarios were
presented to the subjects was alternated to minimize any interaction
effects between scenarios. The version of each scenario a subject re-
ceived was determined independently of the version of other scena-
rios that the subject received. All comparisons were "between-
subjects," meaning that conclusions were drawn by comparing the re-
sponses of subjects who responded to different conditions of the same
scenario. 107
The primary difference between conditions of each scenario was
what default term would govern the relationship between NextDay
and Gifts, Inc. unless the parties agreed explicitly to an alternative
term. Because the experiments sought to test the effect of different
default provisions on preferences for substantive contract terms, it was
important that the subjects accepted, for the purposes of the experi-
ment, the description of the substantive default term provided in their
version of the scenario. Two steps were taken to ensure that subjects
did not ignore these descriptions of default rules and rely on their a
priori understanding of the content of contract default rules. First,
subjects were explicitly directed to "rely only on the law as it is described to
you in the survey for purposes of answering the questions. Do not rely on
your prior understanding of contract law."108 Second, at the close of
each scenario, subjects were asked to indicate whether (1) the default
rule as described in the scenario was consistent with their knowledge
of contract law, (2) the default rule was inconsistent with their knowl-
edge of contract law, or (3) they were not sure.10 9 The substantive
responses to survey questions provided by subjects who indicated that
their scenario's description of the default rule was inconsistent with
105 See infra Appendices B-D.
106 This Article does not report every condition of each scenario. Thus, the total
number of responses reported for each scenario does not necessarily equal 151 (the total
number of subjects). The Attorneys' Fees scenario, see infra Part II.B.3, was alternated
with another scenario that is not reported in this Article. Consequently, the total number
of subjects responding to that scenario is also less than 151, although all three of the tested
conditions are reported.
107 See generally IRWiN P. LEVIN &JAMEs V. HINRICHs, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY- CON-
TEMPORARY METHODS AND APPuCATIONS 29 (1995) (describing the differences between
"within-subject" and "between-subjects" experimental manipulations).
108 See infra Appendix Al.
109 See infra Appendices B-D.
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their own understanding of contract law were compared to answers
provided by the remainder of the subjects responding to the same
experimental conditions. There were no significant differences in
substantive responses based on the response to this control question,
and no significant results would have lost their significance if the sub-
jects who believed the experiment inaccurately represented the law
were removed from the data set. Consequently, these tests are not
reported in the results section below.
In two of the three scenarios reported below, subjects were asked
to express the strength of their preferences for contract terms that
varied from the default term by stating the maximum amount of
money they would be willing to pay ('WTP") to include such a term in
the contract when the term would favor their client, or the minimum
amount they would be willing to accept ("WTA") to contract for such
a term when the term would favor the other party.110
Soliciting WTP and WTA values carries a risk that subjects will
respond to the inquiry strategically, understating their true WTP value
and overstating their true WTA value."' If this behavior occurs, the
data could appear to reveal a strong status quo bias where none actu-
ally exists. To guard against this potentiality, experimental conditions
that asked subjects to reveal their WTP value explicitly instructed that
this value should be the maximum the subject would be willing to pay
Gifts, Inc. to add a specific provision to a contract, but that they would
attempt to negotiate a smaller payment than their WTP value.112 Sub-
jects asked to reveal their WTA values were instructed that their re-
sponses should be the minimum they would accept to add an
unfavorable term to the contract, but that they would attempt to nego-
tiate a higher payment.113 To ensure that subjects understood the dis-
tinction between revealing their true WTP or WTA values and
understating or overstating that value for strategic purposes, in one of
the scenarios subjects were not only asked to reveal their WTP or WTA
values, they were also instructed to reveal the amount of money they
would initially offer or demand in negotiations with Gifts, Inc." 4 For
subjects in WTP conditions, initial offers should have been equal to or
less than WTP values. For subjects in WTA conditions, initial de-
mands should have been equal to or greater than WTA values. Most
subjects' responses corresponded to this prediction, demonstrating
that the subjects understood what information their WTA or WTP val-
ues were supposed to reveal. Only 4 subjects out of 151 failed this
110 See infra Appendices B-C.
Ill See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 25, at 77-82.
112 See infra Appendices B2, C2.
113 See infra Appendices B1, C1.
114 See infra Appendices C1-2.
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manipulation check by providing initial offer or initial demand values
that were logically inconsistent with their WTA or WTP values. The
responses of these four were dropped from the data set and not con-
sidered in the analysis reported below.
B. Results
1. The Consequential Damages Scenario
The first scenario ("Consequential Damages"), modeled on Had-
ley v. Baxendale, tested whether the strength of subjects' preferences
for a favorable consequential damages term in NextDay's contract
with Gifts, Inc. depended on the substance of the default rule that
would govern in the absence of an agreement between the parties.
The scenario explained that Gifts, Inc. "will be sending many packages
with NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its
corporate clients and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure
to make delivery could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious
from looking at the package itself."' 15 Consequently, Gifts, Inc. would
prefer that NextDay be liable for all damages caused by its failure to
meet its delivery obligations." 6 NextDay, in contrast, would prefer
the more limited liability provided by a rule making it responsible
only for damages resulting from its breach of contract that were rea-
sonably foreseeable at the time it took possession of the package." 7
The scenario also provided all subjects with an analysis of the dif-
ferential liability costs NextDay could expect under a "reasonably fore-
seeable damages" rule and a full-damages rule." 8 The description of
such costs created a bounded but uncertain range of possible out-
comes intended to reflect the uncertainties often faced by business
executives and attorneys making risk-allocation decisions. Subjects
were told that NextDay's accountants had estimated that there was a
95% chance that a full damages term would saddle NextDay with be-
tween $0 and $10 of additional liability per package handled (with a
5% possibility of either no additional liability or additional liability of
greater than $10 per package) compared to a foreseeable damages
term. This calculation took into account that few packages would be
mishandled, but those that were would subject NextDay to considera-
bly more liability under the full-liability term than the limited-liability
term.119 The accountants based their estimate "on the value of Gifts,
Inc.'s shipments with other companies over the last several years...
115 See infra Appendices B1-2.
116 See infra Appendix B1.
117 See infra Appendix B1.
118 See infra Appendices BI-2.
119 See infra Appendices BI-2.
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and NextDay's history of occasionally failing to make deliveries on
time."120
Subjects receiving condition 1 of the Consequential Damages sce-
nario were told that:
The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship
between the parties, follows the traditional legal rule that delivery
companies like NextDay that negligently lose a package or fail to
deliver it on time-which happens occasionally-are generally lia-
ble only for damages that were "reasonably foreseeable" at the time the
delivery company takes possession of the package from the
shipper.121
Gifts, Inc. has proposed that the parties contract around this rule by
adding the following enforceable term to the contract:
"NextDay will be liable for all damages proximately caused by
NextDay's negligent failure to deliver Gifts, Inc.'s merchandise on
time, whether or not such damages were reasonably foreseeable
when NextDay accepted merchandise from Gifts, Inc."122
Subjects were informed that Gifts, Inc. realized it would have to
pay NextDay a higher per-package delivery rate than it would other-
wise pay to convince NextDay to include the full liability term in the
contract. They were then asked to recommend the minimum price
that NextDay should accept in return for including the term (i.e., re-
veal their WTA value), such that if Gifts, Inc. did not offer at least that
much over and above what the per-package price would otherwise be,
NextDay would refuse to agree to the term. The answer choices pro-
vided allowed subjects to set their WTA value at $1 increments be-
tween $1 and $10, or to recommend that NextDay refuse to consent to
the full-damages term at any price. 123
Subjects assigned to condition 2 of the scenario were told the de-
fault rule was the opposite of what condition 1 subjects were told:
The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship
between the parties, specifies that delivery companies like NextDay
are liable for "all damages proximately caused by the delivery company's
negligent failure to deliver a shipper's merchandise on time."124
NextDay would like to add a limited-liability provision to the contract,
which would read:
"In the event that NextDay fails to deliver Gifts, Inc.'s merchandise
on time, its liability will be limited to damages that were reasonably
120 See infra Appendices B1-2.
121 See infra Appendix Bi.
122 See infra Appendix Bi (italics omitted).
123 See infra Appendix Bi.
124 See infra Appendix B2.
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foreseeable when NextDay accepted merchandise from Gifts,
Inc."'125
Condition 2 subjects were advised that in order to convince Gifts,
Inc. to accept the limited-liability provision, NextDay would have to
offer a per-package discount vis-a-vis what would otherwise be the con-
tract delivery price between the companies.12 6 They were asked to
state the maximum per-package discount that they would recommend
that NextDay offer (i.e., their WTP value), such that if Gifts, Inc.
would not accept that discount, NextDay should prefer to have the
contract without the proposed term included.12 7 Similar to condition
1, the answer choices provided in condition 2 permitted subjects to
select a WTP value in $1 increments from $1 to $10, or to recommend
that NextDay refuse to offer any discount for the inclusion of the pro-
posed provision in the delivery contract.128
If preferences for contract terms are exogenous to contract de-
fault rules, subjects in conditions 1 and 2 should have responded iden-
tically, on average, because the monetary scale that both used to
register their preferences represented the difference in value between
the two consequential damages terms. In fact, the subjects exhibited a
large and statistically significant bias in favor of the term embedded in
the default rule-the status quo term. Condition 1 subjects (N=26),
facing a limited-liability default rule, were reluctant to advise NextDay
to contract around that default term. They recommended, on aver-
age, that NextDay demand a minimum of $6.96 per package to do so.
Subjects in condition 2 (N=28), on the other hand, confronting a full-
liability default rule, valued a limited-liability term much less. They
recommended, on average, that NextDay pay a maximum of $4.46 per
package to add the limitation.12 9 Even this large difference probably
understates the strength of the status quo bias. Responses to condi-
tion 1 that indicated a subject would not recommend that NextDay
accept the full liability term at any price ("refusers") were coded as
providing a response of $10 for the purposes of creating a mean WTA
value, even though none of these respondents would have accepted
$10 for the inclusion of the liability term. Even if the refusers are
omitted from the data set entirely-that is, the subjects apparently
most affected by the status quo bias are ignored-the difference be-
tween the resulting WTA of $6.57 for condition I subjects (N=23) and
the $4.46 WTP for condition 2 subjects is highly significant.'8 0
125 See infra Appendix B2.
126 See infra Appendix B2.
127 See infra Appendix B2.
128 See infra Appendix B2.
129 t (52) = 3.89, p < .001.
130 t (49) = 3.23, p < .005.
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Comparing the average responses of subjects in the two condi-
tions does not adequately illuminate the extent of the impact that the
status quo bias would have on actual bargaining outcomes, because
"outlier" responses could make the difference in mean responses
seem large even if the bias would have exerted a minimal effect on
actual bargaining outcomes. To understand the full implications of
the data, conduct the following thought experiment: assume a series
of negotiations were to take place between each experimental subject
representing NextDay and each of a set of attorneys representing
Gifts, Inc., where Gifts, Inc. faces the same expected cost differential
between full- and limited-liability terms and the Gifts, Inc. attorneys
display a status quo bias of the same magnitude that the experimental
subjects displayed. That is, each condition 1 subject (who revealed
his/her WTA value) negotiates under a limited-liability default against
each set of Gifts, Inc. attorneys who have WTP values for contracting
around the limited-liability default that are identical to the WTP val-
ues of the condition 2 subjects. Similarly, each condition 2 subject
(who revealed his/her WTP value) negotiates under a full-liability de-
fault against a series of Gifts, Inc. attorneys who have a range of WTA
values for contracting around the default term identical to the WTA
values of the condition 1 subjects.
If there were no status quo bias, both parties in each of the result-
ing hypothetical negotiating pairs-1456 pairs in all-should have the
same expected value, on average, of the difference between the two
possible liability rules. It follows that WTP values would exceed WTA
values for approximately 50% of the hypothetical negotiating pairs
and, therefore, parties would reach agreements to add the proposed
terms to the contract in 50% of the negotiations. In contrast, in the
hypothetical scenario with the observed status quo bias, there would
have been only 432 agreements to contract around the default term,
or a transaction rate of just under 30% (432 out of 1456).131 Put a
different way, the status quo bias in the Consequential Damages scena-
131 These statistics are derived from the following distribution of subjects' responses:
Condition 1 Condition 2
Response N Response N
"Refusers" 3 $9 1
$10 5 $8 1
$9 1 $7 s
$8 3 $6 2
$7 2 $5 8
$6 1 $4 4
$5 7 $3 3
$4 2 $2 5




rio reduced the number of successful hypothetical transactions by
40% from the total that would be expected if the preference-ex-
ogeneity assumption were an accurate empirical description.
A brief digression is in order to note that the results from the
Consequential Damages scenario cannot be explained by possible de-
viations from risk neutrality on the part of the experimental subjects
flowing predictably from the condition to which they were assigned.
Risk-neutral subjects should have valued the difference between lim-
ited- and full-liability terms at approximately $5 (recall that the costs
of the full liability provision were between $0-$10 per package, with an
unknown distribution in that range), regardless of the default rule.
Risk-averse subjects in condition 1 might have preferred the security
of the limited-liability term, thus providing high WTA values. How-
ever, risk aversion would also cause the subjects in condition 2 to pro-
vide a high WTP value for the less risky limited-liability provision.
Similarly, a risk-seeking profile could cause subjects to place a low
value on the limited-liability provision. Although this would explain
the low WTP values provided by condition 2 subjects, however, it is
inconsistent with the observed high WTA values of the condition 1
subjects. Risk-seekers should be willing to accept a relatively small
amount of money to add the risky full-liability term to the contract.
If an individual faces a declining marginal utility for money, he
should be risk-averse if he is poor, but close to risk-neutral if he is
extremely wealthy.132 If condition 1 subjects perceive NextDay as
wealthier (because the default rule favors it) than condition 2 subjects
do, it is possible that condition 2 subjects could assume a slightly more
risk-averse attitude when advising NextDay. The difference in re-
sponses between subjects in the two conditions, though, cannot be
explained by such a difference in risk preference arising from percep-
tions of wealth. A full-damages term is riskier for NextDay than a lim-
ited-liability term. If differences in risk preference caused the
differences in subject responses, then we would expect condition 2
subjects (the "poorer" subjects) to place a greater premium on the
limited-liability term, thus reducing the risk. This trend would be re-
flected by condition 2 subjects expressing a willingness to pay more
for a limited-liability provision than condition 1 subjects would de-
mand to relinquish a limited-liability provision in favor of the riskier
full liability. The experimental results, of course, are just the oppo-
site: condition 2 subjects express a willingness to pay far less than the
asking price of condition 1 subjects.
132 For a mathematical demonstration of why this is so, seeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Gains,
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAl. L. REv. 113, 117 n.13 (1996).
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2. The Impossibility Excuse Scenario
The status quo bias evident in the Consequential Damages scena-
rio was replicated in a similar scenario that considered the allocation
of risk of damages caused by unforeseen circumstances that would
make it impossible or commercially impracticable for NextDay to
meet its delivery obligations. In condition 1 of this "Impossibility Ex-
cuse" scenario, subjects were told that their state's law provides that:
[T] he occurrence of a contingency that is both unforeseen and be-
yond the control of the delivery company that makes it physically
impossible or commercially impractical within reason for it to meet
its delivery obligation constitutes a valid excuse for non-peform-
ance of the delivery obligation. In such a situation the delivery com-
pany must refund the money it charged its customer for the delivery
but is not responsible for any additional damages. 133
Notwithstanding this default rule, subjects were informed that Gifts,
Inc. had proposed the following, fully enforceable, contract term that
would shift the risk of damages to NextDay:
"NextDay will be liable for applicable contract damages should it
fail to deliver a package on the next day, as promised under the
contract, regardless of the occurrence of any contingency, whether
or not it is unforeseen or beyond NextDay's control."134
Subjects were then told that Gifts, Inc. planned to offer a lump-
sum side payment to NextDay if NextDay would consent to this provi-
sion. These subjects were then asked to recommend to NextDay the
minimum amount it should be willing to accept for incurring addi-
tional liability under the provision. 135 No information concerning the
possible costs of the added exposure was provided but, as a bench-
mark, the survey informed subjects that the contract with Gifts, Inc.
would earn NextDay revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of
which 20% would be profit.136
In condition 2 of the Impossibility Excuse scenario, subjects were
provided with a default rule opposite of the one described in condi-
tion 1:
Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its
obligation of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the
law of your state, as in most others, the occurrence of such a contin-
gency is no defense to a breach of contract claim-that is, NextDay
133 See infra Appendix C1.
134 See infra Appendix C1 (italics omitted).
135 See infra Appendix Cl.
136 See infra Appendix C1.
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is still held liable for damages despite occurrences beyond its
control.' 3 7
Subjects were then told that NextDay would like to propose that
the following, enforceable provision be added to the contract:
"If a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond
NextDay's control occurs making it physically impossible or com-
mercially impractical within reason for NextDay to meet its 'next
day' delivery obligation, NextDay will refund the money paid for the
shipment of the package but Gifts, Inc. will not be entitled to any
additional contract damages." 1a8
Subjects were then informed that NextDay understands that in order
to convince Gifts, Inc. to accept the additional risk that this provision
entails, it will have to offer a side payment. To maintain symmetry
with condition 1, subjects were also informed that NextDay's expected
annual revenue from its relationship with Gifts, Inc. was $2 million, of
which 20% would be profitL 3 9
As was true in the Consequential Damages scenario, the prefer-
ence-exogeneity assumption implicitly carries with it the prediction
that the responses offered by condition 1 subjects would not differ, on
average, from those offered by condition 2 subjects. In effect, subjects
in both conditions were asked to perform the same task: place a value
on the difference between a contract in which impossibility is a valid
excuse for nondelivery and one in which it is not.140 Once again,
though, the content of the default term did have a large and statisti-
cally significant effect on the strength of subjects' preference for in-
corporating the impossibility excuse into the contract with Gifts, Inc.
Condition 1 subjects (N=-22) recommended, on average, that NextDay
demand a minimum side payment of $302,000 in order to accept a
term that would eliminate NextDay's ability to invoke the impossibility
excuse. Condition 2 subjects (N=-25), in contrast, recommended, on
average, that NextDay pay no more than $78,000 to add an impossibil-
ity excuse provision to the contract. The difference between the two
means is highly significant whether the actual responses are com-
137 See infra Appendix C2.
138 See infra Appendix C2 (italics omitted).
139 See infra Appendix G2.
140 Unlike the Consequential Damages scenario, the Impossibility Excuse scenario
does not provide subjects with a certain range of the additional costs NextDay would incur
under a contract in which it assumed more liability rather than less liability. This differ-
ence, however, provides no reason to think that subjects in conditions 1 and 2 of the Im-
possibility Excuse scenario would respond differently to each other, on average, than
condition 1 and 2 subjects in the Consequential Damages scenario. If anything, the lack of
a certain range of outcomes would lead to a prediction that there would be greater noise
in subjects' responses to the Impossibility Excuse scenario than the Consequential Dam-
ages scenario, and thus a lesser likelihood of statistically significant differences between the
subjects in different conditions.
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pared,141 the natural logarithms of the actual responses are compared
(to smooth out a highly skewed distribution),142 or even if the higher
condition 1 outlier valuations (those greater than $400,000) are re-
moved from the data set entirely, thus reducing the mean response of
condition 1 subjects and bringing the two means closer together.143
In terms of impact on bargaining activity, the status quo bias was
even stronger in the Impossibility Excuse context than in the Conse-
quential Damages scenario. Matching each subject's response with
each of an identical number of hypothetical Gifts, Inc. lawyers facing
the same information and endowed with the same preferences would
create transactions in only 22% of the resulting hypothetical negotia-
tions (242 transactions in 1100 negotiations),44 less than half of the
50% that would be expected if the subjects' substantive preferences
were exogenous to the content of the default rule. Put another way,
for the experimental subjects, after negotiations, the default term
would govern the parties' relationship more than 75% of the time. In
contrast, the preference-exogeneity assumption would lead to the pre-
diction that the default term would govern the parties' relationship
only 50% of the time, assuming no transaction costs. 145
3. The Attorneys' Fees Scenario
The results of both the Consequential Damages and Impossibility
Excuse scenarios suggest that in situations where the default contract
term systematically favors either buyers or sellers of goods or services
and where the disfavored party seeks to add a term to the contract to
gain an advantage, the strength of the parties' preferences and,
141 t (48) = 3.37, p < .001.
142 t (48) = 8.80, p < .001.
14 t (45) = 3.57, p < .001.
144 These statistics are derived from the following distribution of subjects' responses:
Condition 1 Condition 2
Response N Response N
> $200k 9 $200k 3
$200k 5 $150k 2
$150k 1 $100k 5
$100k 3 $75k 2
$75k 1 > $75k $50k 3
$50k 1 > $50k $25k 4
$25k 1 > $25k $10k 6
$10k 1
145 As was true in the case of the Consequential Damages scenario, differences in risk
preference among subjects could not explain the results. Risk-averse subjects are likely to
have a stronger preference than risk-neutral subjects for a contract providing an impossi-
bility-excuse term because this would limit the unknown risk of liability, which should lead




hence, the substantive term that ultimately governs their relationship,
will depend on the content of the default term. But not every default
term obviously favors either buyers or sellers ex ante, such that the
parties would necessarily adjust the contract price to compensate the
disadvantaged party for agreeing to contract around the default. Does
a status quo bias created by the content of a default term affect whether
parties favor or oppose certain substantive terms in the same way that
it appears to affect the strength of a preference for or against a term?
The "Attorneys' Fees" scenario explicitly explored this question.146
In the Attorneys' Fees scenario, subjects were asked to recom-
mend to NextDay whether it should favor a contractual agreement
with Gifts, Inc. requiring that each party pay its own attorneys' fees in
the event of any litigation between the parties, or one requiring that
the losing party in any litigation pay the attorneys' fees of the prevail-
ing party. Each subject was advised of a few of the pros and cons of
each alternative fee allocation approach: A "loser pays" rule might dis-
courage lawsuits that lack merit and encourage the prompt settlement
of clearly meritorious suits (because the defendant will want to limit
the plaintiff's attorneys' fees). On the other hand, a pay-your-own-fees
rule might encourage more meritorious suits to be filed (because the
plaintiff will not risk being saddled with the defendant's fees) and
could encourage more out-of-court settlements of suits when both
parties believe they will win (because neither side could hope to
recoup its attorneys' fees by litigating).147
Subjects assigned to condition 1 of the Attorneys' Fees Scenario
were given the following information about the applicable default
rule in their jurisdiction:-
When private parties litigate a legal dispute between them, each
generally must pay its own attorneys' fees. However, if the parties
wish to specify by contract that in any future litigation the losing
146 See infra Appendix D.
147 There is an exhaustive literature analyzing the differential effects on litigation vol-
ume and settlement activity of a "loser pays" regime, also known as the "British Rule," and a
pay-your-own-fees regime, also known as the "American Rule." See generally PoSNER, supra
note 14, at 570-76 (discussing the American and British regimes); Symposium on Fee Shifling,
71 CHI.-KENr L. Rxv. 415 (1995) (considering the optimal fee-shifting regime); John J.
Donohue IMl, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase
Theorem, Who WI!?, 104 HAiv. L. Rxv. 1093 (1991) (arguing that no difference exists be-
tween the two rules under Coasean models); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11J. LEGAL STUD.
55 (1982) (examining the effects of risk aversion and informational assymmetries); Sympo-
sium, Attorney Fee Shifting LAw & CoNTr~me. PRoBs., Winter 1984, at 1 (studying fee-shift-
ing); John J. Donohue III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical
Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, LAw & ColEmrP. PROBS., Summer 1991,




party must pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party, such a
provision is fully enforceable.1 48
They were then asked whether they would favor or oppose adding
such a "loser pays" provision to NextDay's contract with Gifts, Inc.149
Subjects assigned to condition 2 of the scenario were presented
with the following, opposite statement of the governing default rule:
Under the law of your state, in litigation arising from disputes
between merchants, the losing party generally must pay the attor-
neys' fees of the prevailing party. However, if the parties wish to
specify by contract that in any future litigation each party must pay
its own attorneys' fees, such a provision would be fully
enforceable. 15 0
They were then asked whether they would favor or oppose adding
such a pay-your-own-fees provision to the contract.' 5 '
Finally, a third version of the scenario-condition 3-attempted
to present the choice neutrally, that is, without identifying either term
as part of the status quo. Condition 3 subjects were told:
Under the law of your state, for either party to seek court adju-
dication of a dispute between merchants, arising out of a contract,
the contract in question must include one of the following two
provisions.... :
(1) In the case of litigation between the parties to this contract,
each party will pay its own attorneys' fees.
(2) In the case of litigation between the parties to this contract,
the losing party will pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing
party.152
Subjects were then asked whether they would favor including provi-
sion (1) or provision (2) in NextDay's contract with Gifts, Inc.153
The results support the claim that the status quo bias can affect
whether a party prefers a particular contract term in addition to the
magnitude of the value it places on a term it favors.154 Of condition 3
subjects (A17), 65% favored the pay-your-own-fees term, while 35%
favored the loser pays term. This distribution can be viewed as the
expected distribution of all subjects assuming that substantive prefer-
ences are exogenous to the default rule. Fifty-nine percent of condi-
tion 1 subjects (AT-17) opposed including a "loser pays" term in the
148 See infra Appendix D1.
149 See infra Appendix D1.
150 See infra Appendix D2.
151 See infra Appendix D2.
152 See infra Appendix D3 (italics omitted).
153 See infra Appendix D3.
154 See infra Table 1.
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contract, effectively preferring the default pay-your-own-fees rule. In
contrast, 72% of the condition 2 subjects (N=18) opposed adding a
pay-your-own-fees term, effectively favoring the default "loser pays"
rule. In other words, the majority of subjects preferred whichever
term was the default. The responses of the condition 1 and 2 subjects
collectively differed significantly from the expected distribution, dem-
onstrating that the content of the default rule affected subjects' pref-
erences. 155 Additionally, the responses of subjects in condition 2 alone
significantly differed from the expected distribution. 15 6
TABLE 1. ATroRNW' FEES SCENARIO RESULTS
Condition N Default Rule Prefer "Pay-Your-Own" Prefer "Loser-Pays"
1 17 "Pay-Your-Own" 59% 41%
2 18 "Loser-Pays" 28% 72%
3 17 None 65% 35%
The responses provided by subjects in condition 1 did not differ
significantly from those provided by condition 3 subjects,15 7 a result
that is not surprising. All law students know that the default rule in
the United States generally is that each party pays its own attorneys'
fees. Because condition 3 did not identify either pay-your-own-fees or
loser pays as the default rule in the particular case, it would be natural
for subjects assigned to that condition to code the pay-your-own-fees
provision as the status quo option and to respond accordingly, just as
would condition 1 subjects who were explicitly informed that pay-
your-own-fees was the default rule.
C. Motivational Hypotheses
Before evidence of the status quo bias can be useful to lawmakers,
a motivational theory must be developed to explain the effect. With-
out understanding why contract default rules can create a status quo
bias, it is difficult to determine both whether lawmakers should be
concerned with the bias and, if so, how they might act to minimize its
effects.
1. Explanations Consistent with Preference Exogeneity
Before questioning why lawmakers' choices of default terms can
affect contracting parties' preferences for the content of those terms,
explanations for the data consistent with the preference-exogeneity
assumption must be ruled out. Defenders of the assumption could
argue that the data might be explained as evidence of transaction
155 X= 7.31, p<.01.
156 X= 10.74, p = .001.
157 X2 =.26, p =.6.
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costs or the signaling of private information but, as the following two
subsections will explain, neither is a plausible explanation for the ex-
perimental results.
a. Merely Evidence of Transaction Costs?
Taken alone, the existence of a bias in favor of the status quo is
not sufficient evidence of inefficient contracting behavior. For exam-
ple, the status quo bias might simply be an indication that parties face
non-zero transaction costs, and that incurring high costs of analyzing
and negotiating alternatives to the status quo might lead to theoreti-
cally optimal rules that are not worth the candle. 158 To demonstrate,
assume the following facts: (1) the jurisdiction follows the Hadley rule
that carriers are responsible only for reasonably foreseeable dam-
ages,159 (2) Gifts, Inc. would be willing to pay slightly more for a full-
liability term than the costs NextDay would incur by taking necessary
additional precautions to minimize its liability under a full-liability
term, but (3) the costs of incorporating a full-liability term into the
contract are extremely high. Under these facts, a full-liability provi-
sion is optimal in theory, but high transaction costs make it more effi-
cient for NextDay and Gifts, Inc. to accede to the suboptimal default
term than to contract around it.
This same analysis is appropriate when search costs for alterna-
tives to the default term are high.' 60 Consider a default rule that ren-
ders the impossibility excuse invalid. Assume that some form of an
impossibility excuse might be preferable to the no-excuse default
term, but that the cost associated with analyzing all possible permuta-
tions of an impossibility term and the effects of each on the parties'
expected profits from the contract are greater than the expected ben-
efit of replacing the default rule with such a term. Yet, accepting the
default rule is efficient behavior for the parties, although the default
term itself is suboptimal. Accordingly, the status quo, as represented
by the default term, will affect the content of contracts, but only be-
cause, as traditional law-and-economics theorists have hypothe-
158 See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 56, at 34 (pointing out that "transaction
costs may make any switch from the status quo costly in itself'); cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contrac4 47 STAN. L. Rrv. 211, 214-15 (1995) (argu-
ing that searching for and processing information is costly and that, as a result, individuals
often "satisfice" rather than optimize).
159 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 56, at 34 ("An individual may well
stick to a low-payingjob if the process of searching for a better one is slow, uncertain, and/
or costly."); cf Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands,
72 AM. ECON. REv. 349 (1982) (identifying the advantage pioneering brands have over




sized,16' the parties wish to avoid transaction costs, not because the
embodiment of a term in a default rule increases parties' desire for its
content.
Although plausible in some instances, these "transaction cost" ac-
counts of the status quo bias are easily dismissed as explanations for
the results of the default-rule experiments presented in this Article.
The experiments involved only two parties, suggesting the physical
costs of negotiating would likely be low under any circumstances.' 62
More importantly, in these three scenarios specifically, the parties' ne-
gotiation costs were identical whether they accepted the default term
at issue or contracted around it. In the Consequential Damages and
Impossibility Excuse scenarios, the fact patterns were constructed so
that the parties were already immersed in negotiations over the con-
tract terms, and the only issue was their reservation prices-the appli-
cable transaction costs were sunk 63 and were no greater if parties
were enthusiastic about contracting around the default rule than if
they were equivocal or downright opposed to contracting around it.'6
In the Attorneys' Fees scenario, subjects were asked merely to indicate
whether they favored or opposed a fee-allocation term inconsistent
with the default term, not the extent to which they would take affirma-
tive efforts to shepherd it through the bargaining process.' 65 Again,
no choice of responses implied the subject or her client would incur
161 See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., JohnJ. Donohue III, Diverting The Coasean River Incentive Schemes To Reduce
Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 556 (1989) ("The number of actors involved in a
potential Coasean bargaining situation has been deemed critical to the emergence of an
efficient outcome.... Two is the optimal number of parties from the perspective of reduc-
ing the costs of coordination."); cf Schwab, supra note 9, at 267-68 (noting that
"[blargaining costs are likely to be lower in labor negotiations" because there are only two
parties to the negotiations and the parties are likely to be engaged in negotiations on other
points anyway, making the marginal cost of adding an additional item small). Donohue
also notes that "if the parties are locked in a bilateral monopoly, where neither party has
alternatives to dealing with the other, transaction costs will be sharply elevated" because
the parties could have difficulty agreeing on how to divide the surplus. Donohue, supra, at
556. Although the default-rules experiments were designed as bilateral monopoly situa-
tions, the potential costs of competitive bargaining were avoided by requiring the subjects
to state their reservation prices rather than to actually reach an agreement on contract
terms.
163 Sunk costs should not affect the decisions of parties seeking to maximize their
wealth through contract. See generally RicHARD A. BREALm" & STEwART C. MYERS, PRINCULES
OF CORPORATE FINANcE 115 (5th ed. 1996) ("Sunk costs are like spilled milk They are past
and irreversible outflows."); Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology and Economics Conference
Handbook Comments on Simon, on Einhorn and Hogarth, and on Tversky and Kahneman, in
RATIONAL CHoIcE: THE CoNTPRAsr BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 95, 98 (Robin M.
Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987) ("Historical or sunk costs should be irrelevant.");
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 56, at 37 ("One of the earliest lessons in economics is
that decisions should be based on incremental benefits and costs.").
164 See infra Appendices B1-2, C1-2.
165 See infra Appendices Dl-3.
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higher transaction costs involved with negotiating or drafting the final
contract than any other response.
Similarly, the design of the scenarios ruled out search and analy-
sis costs as the cause of the status quo bias. In each, decision choices
were binary: "reasonably foreseeable damages" versus "all damages,"
an "impossibility excuse" versus "no excuse," "pay your own fees" ver-
sus "loser pays"166-and considering the costs and benefits of the al-
ternative to the default term required no more time or attention than
considering the costs and benefits of the default term. Although the
scenarios in no sense provided subjects with all the information about
the likely impact of the alternative term that a lawyer might like to
have at her disposal before providing advice to a client, neither did
they provide all desirable information about the likely impact of the
default term. Furthermore, because the content of all default terms
was determined by lawmakers and bore no relationship to the sub-
jects' hypothetical prior choices or actions, the subjects had no reason
to assume that the default terms must reflect their prior considered
and thoughtful analysis. Consequently, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the transaction costs associated with contracting around
the default term did not cause the demonstrated status quo bias.
b. Private Information?
When bargaining over a contract term, information learned in
the bargaining process can affect a party's preference for a given
term. As the literature on the implications of strategic bargaining for
the content of default rules points out, the mere fact that a party pro-
poses contracting around a default term can implicitly communicate
information about that party that affects the other party's evaluation
of the term.167 For example, as noted above, in an industry with a
default rule requiring mandatory arbitration of commercial disputes,
a proposal to contract around the default and provide access to courts
might signal that the proposing party would have an advantage in
court relative to the receiving party or be at a disadvantage in arbitra-
tion.168 This information about the proposing party could strengthen
the receiving party's preference for arbitration.
In the Consequential Damages scenario, condition 1 subjects re-
ceived a proposal from Gifts, Inc. to contract for full liability, rather
than the default of limited liability, while condition 2 subjects, told
that NextDay wanted to contract around the default of full liability,
166 See infraAppendices B1-2, C1-2, D1-3.
167 See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 97-100 (discussing how penalty default
rules encourage the production of information).
168 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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did not receive the same information about Gifts, Inc.'s preference. 169
Similarly, in the Impossibility Excuse scenario, condition 1 subjects
received a proposal from Gifts, Inc. to contract around the default
rule that recognized the impossibility excuse, whereas condition 2
subjects were informed that NextDay desired to contract around the
opposite default. 70 Gifts, Inc.'s proposals should not have affected
the preferences of condition 1 subjects in either scenario, however,
because those proposals conveyed no previously unknown
information.
With respect to the Consequential Damages scenario, Gifts, Inc.'s
proposal of a full-liability term was hardly revealing because any ship-
per would prefer a full-liability term to a limited-liability term. Fur-
thermore, subjects were also told that NextDay's accountants
evaluated the expected marginal cost of full liability based on the his-
torical value of Gifts, Inc.'s deliveries and NextDay's historical misde-
livery rate at between $1 and $10 per package,' 71 indicating,
independent of both Gifts, Inc.'s proposal and common sense, that a
full-liability term would benefit Gifts, Inc. significantly enough to
make it worthwhile for Gifts, Inc. to propose such a term. Of course,
if Gifts, Inc. had expressed a willingness to pay a high amount for the
term (for example, more than $5), that could have been viewed as an
indication that Gifts, Inc. had reason to expect higher unforeseeable
losses than NextDay anticipated, possibly because it had information
unavailable to NextDay. This could, in turn, have reasonably caused
subjects representing NextDay to reevaluate the strength of their pref-
erence for a limited-liability term and to demand a higher price to
agree to full liability. However, the scenario was carefully designed to
avoid such a potential signal. Gifts, Inc. did not reveal any informa-
tion about how much it might be willing to pay for a full-liability term,
only that it preferred such a term over a limited-liability term.
Likewise, in condition 1 of the Impossibility Excuse scenario,
Gifts, Inc.'s proposal to contract around the default term indicated
only the obvious fact that it would prefer a contract that did not recog-
nize an impossibility excuse to one that did. The proposal revealed
no information about the strength of Gifts, Inc.'s preference, which
might have been relevant to the subjects' analysis. In the unlikely
event that condition 1 subjects mistook Gifts, Inc.'s proposed no-ex-
cuse term as a signal that Gifts, Inc. had an unusually strong prefer-
ence for such a term (thus causing subjects to increase their WTA
values above what they would have otherwise been), this bias should
have been equalized by the opposite instruction given to condition 2
169 See infra Appendices B1-2.
170 See infra Appendices C1-2.
171 See infra Appendices B1-2.
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subjects-that NextDay wished to propose an excuse term to the con-
tract (thus causing subjects to increase their WTP values above what
they would have otherwise been). 172
It was conceivable, although unlikely, that the condition 1 sub-
jects in these two scenarios familiar with Gifts, Inc.'s proposal to con-
tract around the default rule would have provided higher reservation
prices than condition 2 subjects if they wanted to prevent their "adver-
sary" from getting something that it proposed. In other words, the
information revealed to condition 1, but not condition 2, subjects was
not that Gifts, Inc. would benefit from a full-liability or a no-excuse
contract term, but that Gifts, Inc. proposed such a term. This hypothe-
sis, though, would require that subjects view Gifts, Inc. negatively, to
provide the motivation for the spiteful act of inflating NextDay's reser-
vation price above what it would otherwise be, solely to prevent Gifts,
Inc. from obtaining its proposed term.178 Although the scenarios
were carefully created to avoid portraying Gifts, Inc. in a bad light, it is
conceivable that some subjects could have ascribed negative attributes
to NextDay's customer. To ensure that a spiteful response to Gifts,
Inc.'s proposals did not create the observed status quo bias, all sub-
jects were asked at the end of their participation in the experiment
whether their feelings toward Gifts, Inc. were positive, negative, or
neutral. Answers provided to that question revealed no significant ef-
fect on subjects' responses to the Consequential Damages and Impos-
sibility Excuse scenarios. Consequently, it seems fair to eliminate spite
as an explanation for the status quo bias in these experiments.
In the Attorneys' Fees scenario, which measured the subjects'
preference for a "loser pays" or a pay-your-own-fees rule, 174 a proposal
to contract around a default rule by Gifts, Inc. could have signaled
relevant information, because it was unclear which party, if either,
stood a better chance of ultimately benefitting from either term.
None of the conditions of that scenario, though, provided any infor-
mation about which fee-allocation term Gifts, Inc. preferred-subjects
were merely asked whether they would favor or oppose contracting
around the default. 175 Consequently, there is no possibility that the
status quo bias demonstrated by the results of that scenario could have
been caused by the signaling of private information about Gifts, Inc.
172 Compare infra Appendix Cl, with infra Appendix C2.
173 Cf Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Bariers to Litigation Settlement: An
ExperimentalApproach, 93 MlCH. L. Rxv. 107, 155-60 (1994) (finding that experimental sub-
jects were less likely to accept a litigation settlement offer from an adversary than they were
to accept the same settlement if proposed by a mediator, even when there was no possibil-
ity that the adversary possessed private information, so long as the adversary had treated
the subject poorly in the past).
174 See infra Appendices D1-3.




One explanation for why individuals are often willing to pay far
less for an item to which they have no entitlement than they are will-
ing to accept for the same item if they do have an entitlement to it is
that WTP values are constrained by wealth in a way that WTA values
are not.176 A person with limited funds who places a high value on an
entitlement might demand an extremely high price to sell it while,
because of those limited funds, offering a relatively modest amount of
money to buy it177
Whatever the merits of this explanation in other contexts,1 78 it is
not a plausible description of subjects' motivation in the contract de-
fault rules experiments for at least three reasons. First, NextDay was
presented implicitly as a major corporation with only a small part of its
wealth at stake in its dealings with Gifts, Inc. 79 Although subjects
might have viewed NextDay operating under a default rule of liability
for only foreseeable damages or under a rule that permitted the im-
possibility excuse as somewhat wealthier than NextDay operating
under the opposite defaults, nothing in the facts implied that this dif-
ference would have any more than a trivial effect on the company's
overall wealth. Moreover, in the Consequential Damages scenario,
any payment offered by NextDay for the adoption of a limited-liability
term would come in the form of a discount on future services, not in
cash, suggesting that any presumed constraints on cash-in-hand
should not affect expressed WTP values. In any event, the results of
the Attorneys' Fees scenario effectively exclude resource constraints as
a significant motivating cause of the status quo bias in the set of exper-
iments as a whole, just as it excludes signaling as an explanatory fac-
tor. Because a preference for either choice of fee allocation rules
176 Herbert Hovenkamp argues that this is the source of the endowment effect. Her-
bert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEc.AL STuD. 225, 225 (1991).
But see RicHAPD H. THALER, QUAsI RAnoNAL ECONOMICS xi-xii (1991) (relating an informal
survey in which subjects would pay only $200 to reduce a risk of immediate death by 1 in
1000 but would demand $50,000 to allow a 1 in 1000 increase in the risk of immediate
death, despite being told that they could pay off their bids over 30 years interest free).
177 See Hovenkamp, supra note 176, at 231; see also KEsMAN, supra note 13, at 143 (argu-
ing that Native Americans stripped of their land by European settlers could never afford to
buy it back, but that it is unclear whether the Europeans could have offered enough to
induce the Native Americans to sell the land if they had recognized the natives as rightful
owners).
178 See Korobkin, supra note 54, at 680-82 (criticizing Hovenkamp's explanation on the
grounds that resource constraints should reduce what an individual is willing to accept for
an entitlement, just as it reduces what she is willing to pay for that entitlement, because the
proceeds of a sale of the entitlement can be used to purchase other items that the cash-
constrained party is likely to lack).
179 See infra Appendix A2 (describing NextDay as similar to "Federal Express").
19981
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
would not have entailed the transfer of money, resource constraints
cannot explain the observed status quo bias. 80
3. Decommodification
The law-and-economics assumption that actors subject to the
legal system seek to maximize their utility or wealth presumes that all
entitlements are commensurable-individuals can compare the value
they place on one entitlement to other entitlements or to money.' 8 '
One theory of the motivational basis of the status quo bias posits that,
to the contrary, people think that some values are incommensurable
and should not be monetized or otherwise traded off against other
values.'82 Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca have called these "pro-
tected values."'183 Variants of this theory predict that individuals will
refuse to accept cash payments or barter in exchange for sacrificing
protected values, 184 or, at least, will demand a premium for doing so
to compensate for the disutility caused by sacrificing a protected
value.'8 5 In either case, these apparent high valuations will not be
reflected in what the same individuals are willing to pay for the pro-
tected value.
Many people are likely to see rights to environmental resources as
protected goods which are inappropriate to sacrifice for a payment. 8 6
This contention finds support in a set of experiments by Rebecca
180 The results of the Consequential Damages and Impossibility Excuse scenarios are
inconsistent with the different, yet related, hypothesis that subjects led to think of NextDay
as relatively wealthier because the default rule favors it will be more risk averse than sub-
jects led to think NextDay is relatively poorer because the default rule favors Gifts, Inc. For
evidence disconfirming this hypothesis, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
181 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 17 (explaining that rational choice theory
assumes that individuals' preferences can be completely ordered, meaning that the individ-
ual is "not allowed to say, 'I can't compare them'").
182 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1331-34 (1986) (claiming that individuals cannot
reduce all desires to the same common denominator, but rather they arrange desires in
hierarchies, and that items in one level of the hierarchy will not be traded for items in a
lower level); Kelman, supra note 47, at 692 (noting a human desire "to withdraw spheres of
activity from the realm of marginalism and calculation... because the commodity relation-
ship is undesirable").
183 Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values (1996) (unpublished working
paper, on file with author).
184 See id. at 348-49.
185 Cf Harrison, supra note 182, at 1333 (pointing out that the same individual who
believes that breaching a contract is immoral and would therefore not do so for the oppor-
tunity to increase his wealth by $100 might breach the contract if doing so will increase his
wealth by $500).
186 Cf Julie R. Irwin, Buying/Selling Price Preference Reversals: Preference for Environmental
Changes in Buying Versus Selling Modes, 60 ORGANiZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 431, 436 (1994) (claiming that the body of empirical evidence suggests that the
status quo bias depends on commodity type, with the bias being stronger for environmen-
tal commodities than for consumer commodities).
654 [Vol. 83:608
CONTRACT DEFAULT RULES
Boyce et al., who found that subjects' WTA prices for trees increased
markedly when experimenters told the subjects that all trees that the
subjects sold would be killed. 8 7 In contrast, WTP prices for trees did
not increase significantly when subjects learned that unpurchased
trees would be killed,188 presumably because subjects felt no moral
obligation to save the trees, only an obligation to avoid playing an
affirmative role in their deaths.
It seems highly unlikely a priori that contracting parties would
decommodify their entitlements to the protection of default contract
rules, both because contract terms are usually thought to be means to
the ends of wealth maximization rather than ends in themselves, and
because default terms by their nature (given that parties are free to
alter them) beg to be commodified and traded. It is plausible,
though, that some parties may decommodify certain contract terms
when they are entitled to such terms and refuse to trade-off those
terms against other valuable consideration in a way that they do not
refuse to do when they have no initial entitlement. The results from
the Consequential Damages scenario lend some support to this hy-
pothesis: 12% (3 of 26) of the subjects in condition 1 (the WTA condi-
tion in which the default term is limited liability), said that they would
refuse to give up the limited-liability term for any amount of money.
But the same results clearly show that more is motivating the status
quo bias than an unwillingness to commodify entitlements to contract
terms provided by default rules. Even with the responses of these "re-
fuser" subjects removed from the data set, the difference between the
mean responses of subjects in the two experimental conditions (WTA
condition = $6.57; WTP condition = $4.46) is highly significant. 189
4. Loss Aversion
The concept of "loss aversion" provides a more promising expla-
nation of the status quo bias.190 Since Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman coined this term as part of "prospect theory,"' 91 their de-
scriptive behavioral model offered as an alternative to expected-utility
theory,192 psychologists have gathered a great deal of evidence that
187 Boyce et al., supra note 88, at 1369-71.
188 See id. at 1369.
189 t(49) = 3.23, p < .005.
190 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskiess Choice: A Reference-Depen-
dent Mode4 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1041 (1991); see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 49,
at S258 (describing "loss aversion" as it applies to decision-making that is motivated by
values).
191 The first of many presentations of prospect theory by Tversky & Kahneman was
published in 1979. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRcA 263 (1979).
192 Prospect theory offers three predictions about decisionmaking behavior. (1) that
when forced to choose between certain and uncertain alternatives, individuals will tend to
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the utility consequences to individuals of suffering a loss from a refer-
ence point weigh more heavily than an equivalent gain from the same
reference point.193 If contracting parties are much more concerned
with losing some rights than with gaining others, bargaining to
change from the status quo to alternative states could be significantly
limited.
Loss aversion could well explain the status quo bias observed in
the contract default rule experiments. In the Attorneys' Fees scena-
rio, subjects in condition 1 had the opportunity to substitute a "loser
pays" term for the pay-your-own-fees default.194 If subjects are loss-
averse, they might feel more unhappiness from the prospect of losing
the benefits of the pay-your-own-fees term than happiness from the
thought of the benefits to be gained from the "loser pays" term, all
other things being equal. (That is, they believe the benefits and the
costs of the alternative systems are roughly equivalent in the abstract.)
Subjects in condition 2 ("loser pays" default) might have the opposite
response. These predictions are consistent with the finding that most
subjects preferred the default term, regardless of which term it was. 195
In the Consequential Damages and Impossibility Excuse scena-
rios, subjects were asked to place a monetary value on terms that
would limit NextDay's liability for damages resulting from its failure to
perform its contractual obligations. In condition 1 of each scenario,
subjects stood to lose the limited-liability term and gain money.196 In
condition 2, subjects stood to gain the limited-liability term and lose
money.197 The concept of loss aversion is consistent with the subjects'
greater preference for the limited-liability term when they stood to
lose the term than when they stood to gain it.198
make risk-averse choices when they perceive the alternatives as "gains" from some status
quo position, but will tend to make risk-seeking choices when they perceive the alternatives
as "losses" from a reference point; (2) that individuals value losses of a certain magnitude
more heavily than gains of the same magnitude; and (3) that individuals value certainty
more heavily than expected utility theory would predict. For a cogent explanation of all
three of these branches of prospect theory by its creators, see Kahneman & Tversky, supra
note 67, at 343-49. For a more detailed description of the first aspect of prospect theory,
which is not considered in detail in this Article, see Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 173, at
129-38; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look
at the Role of the Laryer, 76 TEx. L. RExv. 77 (1997).
193 See, e.g., Tversky & Kalneman, supra note 190, at 1040-45 (reviewing empirical evi-
dence of the phenomenon).
194 See infra Appendix D1.
195 See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
196 See infra Appendices B1, Cl.
197 See infra Appendices B2, C2.
198 See Tversky & Kalneman, supra note 49, at S258 (noting that "[l]oss aversion may
... contribute to the observed discrepancies between the amount of money people are





The concept of loss aversion provides a convincing descriptive ac-
count of the status quo bias, but it is neither completely satisfying nor
helpful because it provides no motivational theory: why are individuals
often loss-averse? One possible explanation is that when conse-
quences of decisions are uncertain, there exists the possibility of ex
post regret,199 and that individuals experience greater regret when
undesirable consequences follow from action than when they follow
from inaction. 200 Under this theory, actively switching from the status
quo position carries with it a higher risk of regret than failing to
switch from the status quo to an alternative state, meaning that the
loss outweighs a gain when the entitlements themselves have
equivalent value.
Regret avoidance provides a plausible motivational explanation
for the default-rules experiment results. In the Consequential Dam-
ages scenario, for example, condition 1 subjects were uncertain as to
whether accepting full liability for Gifts, Inc.'s damages would cost
NextDay more or less than the per-package premium it would collect.
Actively moving from the status quo, accepting additional liability
above what the default contract term provided, could result in a net
loss to NextDay, as could retaining the status quo, limited-liability de-
fault. If action that leads to an undesirable outcome creates more re-
gret than inaction that leads to an undesirable outcome, the possibility
of regret is minimized by inaction, all other things equal. Conse-
quently, subjects should demand something more than the five-dollar-
per-package expected cost of accepting the full-liability term. For con-
dition 2 subjects (full-liability default), either inaction or action, the
act of giving Gifts, Inc. a discount for a limited-liability term, could
potentially be the more costly choice. But for these subjects, the ac-
tive choice that could lead to the greatest regret is providing the dis-
199 The regret avoidance theory has been suggested, by a number of theorists, as a
plausible explanation for the status quo bias in other contexts. See, e.g., Harrison, supra
note 182, at 1360 ("Th[e] imbalance [between the way people think about out-of-pocket
expenses and about opportunity costs] may be fueled by a desire to avoid the risk of regret
associated with having made an 'incorrect' change."); Kelman, supra note 47, at 688-89
(giving an example of an individual who experiences greater loss from losing $50 than
from having saved $50); Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 76, at 517 ("The observed reluc-
tance to give up money or assets seems likely to be, at least in part, due to various cognitive
biases and such motives as an incentive to protect against a feeling of regret that might
accompany a deliberately made exchange in asset[s].").
200 Thaler notes that regret is tied to feelings of responsibility, which are likely to be
stronger when an individual makes an affirmative choice than when she makes no choice,
leading individuals to sometimes choose not to choose. Thaler, supra note 53, at 52. He
offers as an example consumer demand for first-dollar (no deductible) health insurance,
which allows consumers to avoid the regret that could follow from deciding not to
purchase an expensive diagnostic test for a low-probability severe illness, only to learn later
that they have the illness and could have been helped by having the test. Id. at 53-54.
19981
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
count for the limited-liability term. If these subjects can minimize the
possibility of regret through inaction, they should be willing to offer a
maximum discount of something less than the five-dollar-per-package
expected benefit of including the limited-liability term in the contract.
The analysis is even simpler for the Attorneys' Fees scenario. Ex
ante, subjects have no way of knowing whether a pay-your-own-fees or
a "loser pays" rule will work to NextDay's benefit over the course of its
relationship with Gifts, Inc.-either choice could turn out to be costly
ex post. If less regret accompanies a poor outcome preceded by inac-
tion rather than by action, subjects who perceive the expected bene-
fits of one fee rule to be greater than the other should opt for their
preferred fee rule, regardless of the status quo, but subjects with only
a marginal preference for one of the fee rules over the other should
favor the inactive choice of not contracting around the default term
in order to minimize the risk of regret.
The regret avoidance theory's critical assumption-regret is
greater when poor results follow action than inaction-is not obvi-
ously correct, but it does have intuitive appeal. Choices made are
probably more salient in people's minds than choices not made.20 '
Kahneman and Tversky,20 2 along with others,203 have conducted ex-
perimental research that provides support for this intuition. In one of
their experiments, 20 4 Kahneman and Tversky told subjects that Mr.
Paul, who owns stock in Company A, considered switching his hold-
ings to Company B, but ultimately decided against it. He later learned
that he would have been $1200 richer had he made the switch. The
authors told the same subjects that Mr. George owned stock in Com-
pany B, and then switched to Company A, later to find out that he
would have been $1200 richer had he left his stock in Company B.20 5
201 Mark Kelman made this point particularly well, noting that being more concerned
with losing out on something one possesses than something one does not possess "hardly
qualifies a person for the loony bin; spending one's life fixated on 'what would have been'
if one had followed through all opportunities seems a far surer path to the psychiatrist's
couch." Kelman, supra note 47, at 689.
202 Daniel Kahneman, Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN:
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 375, 388-89 (NealJ. Roese &James
M. Olson eds., 1995) [hereinafter Kahneman, Varieties]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver-
sky, The Simulation Heuristic, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY HEuRISTIcs AND BIASES 201
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
203 See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What,
Wen and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 379, 380-84 (1995) (discussing other studies on regret);
Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following Action and Inaction: Affective Responses to Positive
Versus Negative Outcomes, 13 PERSONALrTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 524 (1987) (describing
study which found correlation between regret and failed action).
204 Kahneman, Varieties, supra note 202, at 388.
205 See id. at 388-89.
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Ninety-two percent of the subjects judged that Mr. George-who af-
firmatively acted-would feel greater regret.20 6
If regret avoidance provides the correct motivational explanation
for the status quo bias as it applies to contract default rules, the status
quo bias should diminish when it is nearly certain that the benefits to
be gained by deviating from the status quo will exceed the costs and,
consequently, there is little or no reason to fear the possibility of fu-
ture regret. This insight could explain why Schwab failed to find a
significant status quo bias in his experiment dealing with the negotia-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement.20 7 Recall that subjects in
his experiments knew precisely the number of "points" they would re-
ceive for negotiating favorable clauses. 20 8 Consequently, during the
course of negotiations each subject knew whether he was better off
demanding a relocation clause that favored his client or accepting an
unfavorable relocation clause in return for a favorable term concern-
ing another issue that would provide more points. In Schwab's world
of complete certainty as to the value of different contract terms-a
world that probably reflects only a small fraction of actual contract
negotiations-there is virtually no possibility of ex post regret that
would create a bias in favor of the status quo.
The results of a fascinating recent study by Maya Bar-Hillel and
Efrat Neter provide support for this explanation of why Schwab's ex-
periment failed to reveal a status quo bias.20 9 The experimenters
found that when they endowed experimental subjects with a pen and
then offered them a small amount of compensation to trade their pen
for an identical pen, more than ninety percent agreed to trade.210
But when they endowed subjects with a lottery ticket and offered them
similar compensation to trade their ticket for one with a different
number but an identical probability of winning, more than half re-
fused.21' Bar-Hillel and Neter conclude from this data that because
two lottery tickets have the potential for different outcomes, a trade
206 See id. at 388. Terry Connelly et al. recently reported a set of experiments in which
subjects judged that a college student who moved from a section of a course of "average"
quality to a "bad" section of the same course would feel more regret and unhappiness than
a subject who began and remained in the bad section, but that the student who switched
sections would feel no worse if the change resulted from his own choice or from random
reassignment by a computer over which he had no control. Terry Connolly et al., Regret
and Responsibility in the Evaluation of Decision Outcomes 7-12 (1996) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with the authors). These results further refine the causes of decision regret,
providing evidence that the change from the status quo, rather than the actor's choice to
change from the status quo, creates regret if the change turns out in hindsight to be for
the worse.
207 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
208 See supra text accompanying note 96.
209 Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 58, at 25.
210 Id. at 23.
211 Id. at 17-19.
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would "induce an anticipation of regret," and this regret would be
larger if the trade were made than if it were refused.212 If this observa-
tion is correct, it would follow logically that Schwab's subjects, who
knew with certainty whether or not a trade would produce a more
desirable outcome than a refusal to trade, would behave more like
Bar-Hillel and Neter's pen subjects. In contrast, the subjects in the
experiments reported in this Article, who did not know the outcome
of a trade with certainty, would behave more like Bar-Hillel and
Neter's lottery ticket subjects. The generalized implication of this is
that the preferences of parties for contract terms are likely to be more
affected by the choice of default rules when there is substantial uncer-
tainty about the consequences of contracting around the default, and
less affected as uncertainty about ex post consequences diminishes.
The agency relationship built into the design of the default-rule
experiments, in which a lawyer must consider both his client's inter-
ests and his own, puts a unique twist on the possibility of regret from
contracting around a default rule. Recall that the background infor-
mation provided to all subjects informed them that:
At the end of the year, NextDay will review how it fared under the
contract you negotiate and decide whether to retain you as their
attorney in future dealings, so you have a strong personal stake in
making sure that the contract serves the needs of NextDay and re-
flects well on your judgment and ability.2 13
Attorneys, who presumably want to remain employed, have an incen-
tive to minimize not only their regret, but their principal's regret as
well. For this reason, a conceivable hypothesis posits that an agent will
seek to minimize regret even more than would a principal. The same
instruction could also encourage regret-averse behavior because it in-
dicates-as is often true in the legal profession-that the subject
would learn the consequences of her advice to her client. Some re-
search has supported the intuitively appealing conclusion that individ-
uals will exhibit more regret aversion when they know that they will
learn the consequences of their decision, although other research has
disputed this finding.214
212 Id. at 26.
213 See infra Appendix A2.
214 Compare Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 58, at 18 (citing I. Ritov, Probability of Re-
gret Anticipation of Uncertainty Resolution in Choice (paper delivered at the 14th Subjec-
tive Probability, Utility, and Decision Making conference, Fribourg, Switzerland, August
1993)) (finding that a choice between pairs of binary gambles was affected by whether the
resolution of the rejected gamble would be made known), with Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra
note 58, at 18-21 (finding no difference in subjects' willingness to trade their lottery ticket
for another ticket and compensation based upon whether the subjects would learn
whether the original ticket was a winner). For a theoretical statement of regret theory in
general, see Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Ra-
tional Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 808 (1982); see also David E. Bell, Regret in
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D. The Objection: External Validity Concerns
The results from this series of experiments document the exis-
tence of a strong status quo bias in preferences for contract terms and
begin to document some of the contours of that bias. But do they
help confidently predict the preferences and behaviors of actual con-
tracting parties outside the confines of a laboratory experiment? Spe-
cifically, the experimental design implicates three important concerns
about the external validity of the results: the laboratory experiment
method, the subject pool, and the exclusive use of agents rather than
principals as parties in the hypothetical scenarios. This Section briefly
considers each of these issues.
1. The Experimental Method
The use of the experimental method as a basis for legal policy
recommendations inevitably raises the concern that individuals re-
sponding to the incentives of legal rules in the "real" world may not
behave precisely like subjects in controlled experimental condi-
tions.2 15 This might be true both because the scenarios used in the
experimental setting must necessarily abstract from the complexities
of actual bargaining interactions rather than replicate actual interac-
tions, and because subjects might lack the incentive to make optimal
decisions in an experimental setting than would motivate them in an
actual bargaining setting.216
There is no completely satisfying response to these concerns-
the experimental setting can never perfectly mirror the nuanced in-
centives of the real world-but the between-subjects methodology em-
ployed in this set of experiments and the content of the experiments
Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RF-s. 961, 971 (1982) (suggesting that a
person who has chosen a lottery number but not played it might avoid regret by avoiding
hearing the winning number).
215 Cf Thaler, supra note 163, at 96-98 (listing external validity objections commonly
made to social science experimental evidence).
216 But cf. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 191, at 265 (acknowledging that "hypothet-
ical choice" laboratory experiments "rel[y] on the assumption that people often know how
they would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the further assumption that the
subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences," but defending the hypo-
thetical choice experimental method as "the simplest procedure by which a large number
of theoretical questions can be investigated"); Thaler, supra note 163, at 96. According to
Thaler:
If the stakes are large enough, people will get it right. This comment is usually
offered to rebut a demonstration of embarrassing inconsistency on the part
of a group of undergraduate students participating in an experiment at one
of our leading universities. Many such demonstrations have offered the
subjects little or no incentive to think hard or to get the "right" answer ....
Do people tend to make better decisions when the stakes are high? There
is little evidence that they do.
1998]
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obviates these concerns to some degree. First, subjects had no incen-
tive to answer the questions provided with anything other than the
advice that they would provide to an actual client, as they were in-
structed to do. No answer choices could be seen as self-serving or
more socially acceptable than others. Moreover, no less attention,
concentration, or effort was required to provide any answer as any
other possible answer. In other words, it is not clear why subjects
would provide an answer to the survey that did not reflect the advice
they would offer to an actual client in an actual negotiation setting.
Second, because conclusions were based on the differences between
the responses of two or more groups of subjects rather than on sub-
jects' absolute responses, any deviations between subjects' responses
and the advice they would have provided in an actual negotiation are
important only to the extent that the deviations are greater for sub-
jects in one condition than another condition of the same scenario.
Again, this is possible, but it is not obvious why this would be the case.
2. The Representativeness of the Subject Pool
A second external-validity concern is that the experimental sub-
ject pool-first-year law students-might not accurately represent the
class of attorneys whose role they are asked to assume.217 If attorneys
would respond to the experimental scenarios differently than would
the law-student subjects, the results are of questionable value even if
the law students behaved in the experimental setting exactly as they
would have in the real world.
Although it is possible that there are fundamental analytical dif-
ferences between attorneys and nonattorneys that could cause attor-
neys to respond differently to the experimental scenarios,218 the
subjects resemble attorneys in most of the ways likely to be relevant to
the strength of the status quo bias. Having chosen to attend and been
accepted to law school, the subjects are drawn from the same segment
of the general population as practicing lawyers. Having completed
217 In a test of the status quo bias in another context, however, Jonathan Baron and
Joshua Greene found no significant differences between the effect of the bias on University
of Pennsylvania students and subjects recruited from the general population in the Phila-
delphia train station. Jonathan Baron &Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quan-
tity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and
Prominence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 107, 113 (1996).
218 Cf Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 173 (finding that practicing attorneys playing
the role of plaintiffs' lawyers in hypothetical experimental situations to test the effects of a
series of psychological phenomena made systematically different decisions about settle-
ment than did undergraduate students playing the role of plaintiffs in the same hypotheti-
cal experiments). But cf. Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes:
Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L Rxv. L. & ECON. 289, 291-97 (1995) (find-
ing that responses of lawyers and nonlawyers participating in a series of experiments were
not often significantly different).
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nearly all of their first year of law school, the subjects had been inten-
sively exposed to the forms of legal thinking and argumentation, just
as practicing lawyers have, and they have studied the basic principles
of contract law.
The subjects varied substantially from practicing lawyers in only
one potentially relevant way: the amount of experience they had in
analyzing disputes and advising clients. Although it is plausible that
more experience will make lawyers less susceptible to the status quo
bias than law students, this seems unlikely. Even assuming that con-
tracting parties normatively should evaluate contract terms without
reference to the status quo, experience alone is generally not a relia-
ble means of improving decisionmaking skills.219 Experience is useful
only when accompanied by systematic feedback.220 Although practic-
ing lawyers have more experience evaluating contracting options and
advising clients, they are unlikely to receive objective feedback helpful
in evaluating whether they gave the "optimal" advice. 22'
3. The Exclusive Use of Agents
A final concern with the experimental methodology is that, by
relying on the responses of individuals playing the role of lawyers, it
ignores the possibility that the status quo bias will have less of an effect
on commercial entities than on individual agents. A standard assump-
tion of law-and-economics analysis is that, although individuals might
have idiosyncratic, non-wealth-maximizing preferences, market com-
petition will force commercial parties to persistently maximize
wealth.2 22 Because a preference for the status quo, regardless of its
219 See, e.g., Robin M. Dawes, Experience and Validity of Clinical Judgment: The Illusory
Correlation, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & LAw 457 (1989) (illuminating the limits of psychological test-
ing); Howard N. Garb, Clinical Judgment, Clinical Training and Professional Experience, 105
PsYCHOL Buss. 387, 387-91 (1989) (demonstrating that experience does not equate with
decisionmaking ability); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 49, at S274-75 (questioning the
possibility of learning to avoid certain types of error).
220 See MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN NEGO-
TIATION 93 (1991); Thaler, supra note 163, at 96.
221 When attorneys advise clients under conditions of uncertainty, at best they can
learn after the fact whether gambles that they recommended paid off for the client. Learn-
ing whether their advice turned out well in hindsight, however, is not the same as learning
whether the advice represented the optimal gamble for the client. Unlike a lawyer, a doc-
tor who prescribes one of two medications for his patient, each with a less than 100%
chance of saving a dying patient, and then watches his patient die, learns whether he made
an optimal choice. Given the practical inability of lawyers to assess objectively the quality
of their advice ex post, it is highly doubtful that experience in providing advice would
cause lawyers who were affected by the status quo bias in their earlier years (created by the
content of contract default rules), to suddenly become resistant to the powerful allure of
the bias.
222 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1758 (1989) (pointing out that neoclassical economic theory assumes firms seek
to maximize profits); cf. MarkJ. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARv.
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content, is antithetical to wealth maximization, it follows that commer-
cial parties should not exhibit such a preference.
One difficulty with employing this theoretical framework as a ba-
sis for creating contract law is that multiple-agency problems make
even commercial parties reliant on the limits of individual rationality.
In negotiating a complex commercial contract, it is highly likely that a
commercial party-like NextDay in the experimental scenarios-will
rely on the advice of an attorney who herself is an individual, espe-
cially when the bargaining goes beyond price and quantity and fo-
cuses on the finer issues of allocating the risk of unlikely
contingencies. Even when the client closely scrutinizes the advice of
counsel, the scrutiny necessarily comes from an executive who is also
an individual acting as an agent for the corporation.223 Finally,
although evolutionary theory would suggest that commercial entities
that sacrifice large amounts of wealth in pursuit of their agents' psy-
chological satisfaction will be unable to attract customers, capital, or
both,224 the presence of the status quo bias suggests only that such
entities might deviate from wealth-maximizing decisionmaking only
on the margin, but not when an alternative to the status quo option is
far superior to the status quo. How parties contractually allocate low-
probability contingencies is not unimportant, but neither is it likely to
affect a company's survival prospects to the extent that only compa-
nies immune to the effects of the status quo bias on preferences for
contract terms would survive in the competitive commercial
environment.
IV
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATUS Quo BIAS FOR
DEFAULT RuLEs
A. The Importance of Default Rules
The most fundamental insight for contract theory provided by
evidence of the status quo bias is that the choice of default rules mat-
ters all of the time, not just when the parties face high transaction
costs or asymmetric information. If lawmakers' choice of default
terms alters parties' preferences for contract terms-causing an in-
L. REv. 641, 641 (1996) ("The classical evolutionary paradigm has a strong grip on law and
economics scholarship. What survives is presumptively efficient if it were inefficient, the
practice, the law, or the custom would be challenged by its more efficient competitors.").
223 Cf ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 121-22 (photo. reprint 1982) (1933) (arguing that the stockholders' in-
terests in profit maximization may be ignored by corporate managers pursuing their own
interests).
224 See, e.g., STANLEY FISCHER ET AL, ECONOMICS 129-30 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that
managers who do not strive to act in the best interests of the organization will eventually be
"driven out" of the market by competition).
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crease in the strength of their preferences for the default term and a
decrease in the strength of their preferences for alternative terms-
the choice of default terms has the potential to affect any private con-
tract. The status quo bias suggests that the difference between default
and immutable contract rules might be one of degree rather than of
kind-default rules can be seen as "quasi-immutable" rules.
Consider, again, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale limiting damages
for breach of contract to those that were reasonably foreseeable at the
time of contracting.2 25 Under traditional economic analysis of default
rules, a contract that does not explicitly address the scope of conse-
quential damages, and thus implicitly adopts the Hadley default term,
raises concerns of inefficiency only if the parties face high costs of
negotiating or drafting an alternative term, or if one party has a mo-
tive to strategically withhold private information from the other. If
neither high transaction costs nor asymmetric information exist, tradi-
tional economic analysis concludes that the Hadley rule must effi-
ciently allocate between the two parties the risk of damages resulting
from breach if they do not contract around the rule.
The status quo bias makes it impossible to be sure that the failure
to contract around the default rule signifies that the default term is
efficient for the parties, even absent transaction costs and private in-
formation. To borrow from the facts of Hadley again, if a common
carrier could avoid the risk of negligent nondelivery or insure against
unforeseeable damages more cheaply than a shipper, the shipper and
the carrier might still fail to contract around the reasonably foresee-
able default term because the value that they implicitly place on main-
taining the status quo could exceed the gains in trade of contracting
for an alternative allocation of risk.
Taking into account the status quo bias also requires reinter-
preting a situation in which parties do bargain around default terms
by explicitly including alternate terms in the text of the contract.
Under traditional economic analysis, such a scenario would indicate
that the difference in joint value to the parties between the explicitly
adopted term and the default term exceeds the transaction costs of
contracting around the default term and any strategic benefit one
party might be able to capture by concealing information inherent in
an attempt to contract around the default term. The status quo bias
suggests that when parties contract around a default term, the value of
the difference between the alternative term and the default term must
be greater than what traditional economic analysis would conclude:
the difference must exceed (1) the parties' joint transaction costs, (2)
the value to either party of not revealing information that must be
225 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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revealed to contract around the default term, and (3) the parties'joint
preference for the status quo.
Although it is impossible to predict quantitatively the strength of
the contracting parties' preference for the status quo in any individual
case, the status quo bias at a minimum suggests that parties will not
contract around a default contract term when it would only be margin-
ally efficient for them to do so (i.e., doing so would result in a rela-
tively small Pareto improvement) compared with the alternative of
accepting the default provision (i.e., the parties' joint wealth would be
marginally higher under the alternative term). They are, however,
likely to contract around the default term when doing so would be
overwhelmingly efficient (i.e., doing so would result in a large Pareto
improvement).
B. The Efficiency Implication of the Status Quo Bias
Why should lawmakers care whether contracting parties prefer
the status quo to wealth-maximizing contract terms in marginal cases?
Although such a choice fals to maximize the parties' joint wealth, it
apparently maximizes theirjoint utility.2 26 Although law-and-econom-
ics scholars often equate wealth maximization with utility maximiza-
tion,227 nowhere is it written that parties are required to consider only
the best methods to create wealth when they negotiate contract terms.
David Cohen andJack Knetsch have argued that the fact that individu-
als place more importance on items they possess than on foregone
gains "reflect[s] powerful human sentiments" that the law should take
into account. 228
This argument is normatively correct as far as it goes, but it does
not go far enough. There is nothing necessarily irrational about pre-
226 If not, rational parties would not be biased by the status quo. Cf PosNER, supra
note 14, at 14 ("[W]illingness to pay can be determined with great confidence only by
actually observing a voluntary transaction."). If succumbing to the status quo bias were
truly irrational behavior, a strong argument could be made that the bias can affect only the
irrational fringe of contracting parties, rendering it of minimal concern to lawmakers. As
discussed in the remainder of this subsection, the status quo bias's effect is likely to be fully
rational behavior on the level of individual contracting parties and often will be a locally
efficient equilibrium.
227 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
228 Cohen & Knetsch, supra note 79, at 741. Cohen and Knetsch argue that the law
should reinforce, rather than attempt to neutralize, the status quo bias as it applies to
property rights. For example, they point out that if a buyer of a car sells and transfers
possession of the car to a second buyer before paying the original seller in full, the second
buyer will prevail over the original seller in an ownership dispute. Id. at 738-39. However,
if the buyer has collected payment from the second buyer but not yet transferred posses-
sion of the car, the original seller will prevail over the second buyer. See id Cohen and
Knetsch argue that because the status quo bias reflects the attachment individuals feel to
items they possess, the law is efficient in both cases, id. at 738, although wealth maximizers
will claim that there is no difference between the two scenarios, and the law, therefore,
ought to treat them the same.
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ferring the status quo to alternative states and willingly sacrificing
some degree of wealth to maintain the status quo.2 29 It follows that
parties that choose to indulge their preference for the status quo do
not necessarily behave inefficiently by doing so. The flaw in this argu-
ment, as applied to default-rules analysis, is that it confuses a local
optima for a global optima. The status quo position (i.e., the default
term) is imposed on the contracting parties by an external source-a
legislature or court. The selection of a default term can create what
Mark Roe calls "semi-strong form path dependence," meaning that it
is efficient for the parties to maintain the status quo given the initial
determination of the status quo, but it would have been more efficient
for an alternative status quo to have been created initially.230 Given
the establishment of default term A, it might well be locally efficient for
two parties to adopt term A rather than contracting around it in favor
of term B, which would require sacrificing the value to them of main-
taining the status quo. But the parties might have enjoyed a higher
combined utility if lawmakers had established term B as the default
instead, thus allowing the parties to have both the wealth-maximizing
contract term and the status quo, rather than having to choose one or
the other.
The conclusion that follows is this: parties do not necessarily be-
have irrationally when they choose not to contract around a default
term that fails to maximize their joint wealth because of the value they
place on maintaining the status quo, but this determination does not
mean that the default rule itself is optimal.2 31 By choosing a different
default rule, thus creating a different perceived status quo, lawmakers
229 Cf. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 173 (arguing that a litigant who demands a trial
knowing that its risk-adjusted expected value is lower than a settlement offer is not neces-
sarily irrational if the settlement amount would not restore the litigant to the status quo
position he enjoyed prior to the events that led to the litigation and maintaining the status
quo has high value to him).
230 Roe, supra note 222, at 648-50; see also SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 207 (1995) (using the term
.second-degree path dependence"). Roe explains "semi-strong form" path dependence as
a situation in which a structure was once determined for political reasons, by chance, or
because it was then efficient, and, although that structure is now suboptimal, it is not so
suboptimal that it is worth changing. Roe, supra note 222, at 648-50. An example of semi-
strong form path dependence might be the QWERTY typewriter: in the era of manual
typewriters, QWERTY was efficient because it minimized keys sticking; today it is inefficient
relative to other keyboard layouts, but the costs of changing are sufficiently great that do-
ing so would not be worth the candle. See id. at 648. By contrast, "strong-form" path de-
pendence implies that the status quo is so suboptimal that it is worth changing,
notwithstanding the costs of doing so, but decisionmakers still do not make the change.
See id. at 651-52.
231 Michael Klausner has recently made a similar argument about the efficiency of
terms in corporation charters where network externalities are present, which cause firms to
select terms that are suboptimal because a critical mass of corporations have already
adopted the terms. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. R-v. 757, 829-34 (1995).
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might steer the contracting parties to a more desirable equilibrium.
In so doing, they can promote private contracting that is closer to
optimal efficiency. The next three Sections discuss how lawmakers
might accomplish this task.
C. Mimicking Versus Facilitating the Market for Contract Terms
Evidence of the status quo bias adds an element to the discourse
on contract default rules that goes beyond the boundaries of tradi-
tional law-and-economics analysis. It also has implications for the de-
bate within the law-and-economics paradigm over whether
majoritarian default rules, which attempt to mimic a market for con-
tract terms free of transaction costs, or penalty default rules, which
attempt to facilitate private parties' contracting for efficient terms, are
most likely to lead to efficient contracts. The status quo bias strength-
ens the relative case for majoritarian defaults.
Supporters of penalty default rules-defaults that disadvantage
the party with private information in order to force that party to reveal
the private information in an effort to contract around the de-
fault2 32 -concede that it is dangerous policy to set default rules that
are not majoritarian in circumstances in which transaction costs are
likely to be high. The reason why is obvious: penalty defaults can
often force a majority of parties to contract around the default rule.
But if it is prohibitively expensive for parties to do so, the information-
forcing goal of the penalty default will not be fulfilled, and the result
will be that the majority of contracting parties are left with inefficient
contract terms. The friction in bargaining caused by transaction costs,
if high, can nullify the benefit that otherwise could be achieved by
penalty defaults.
The status quo bias effectively presents another source of friction,
different in origin from transaction costs-which are usually under-
stood to be the costs of (1) searching for negotiating partners, (2)
bargaining over terms, and (3) enforcing agreements2 33-but similar
in its effect on bargaining. Consequently, it suggests another reason
why penalty defaults may fail to force disclosure of private informa-
tion. Assume again that most common carriers are cheaper cost
avoiders or insurers of all damages resulting from negligent nondeliv-
ery than most shippers, whether the damages are foreseeable or not.
The proper penalty default might be to hold the carrier responsible
only for reasonably foreseeable damages-forcing the shipper with
private information about the magnitude of its possible losses to re-
232 For a more complete discussion of penalty, or information-forcing defaults, see
supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
233 For a discussion of how "transaction costs" are typically defined, see COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 9, at 84-87.
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veal this information by bargaining for the carrier to accept full liabil-
ity for damages resulting from breach-although such a default would
force a majority of parties to contract around it. But if the benefit of
having the liability reside with the carrier rather than the shipper is
marginal, the status quo bias may swamp the economic benefit of con-
tracting around the rule, causing the parties to accept the default rule
and resulting in private information remaining hidden. The status
quo bias is more troubling to the efficient operation of penalty de-
faults than are transaction costs because it is more likely that
lawmakers can predict ex ante what types of contracts are likely to
have large transaction costs-multiple-party contracts, for example-
than that they can predict when the status quo bias is likely to be large
relative to the gains in efficiency from contracting around a default
rule.
Just as majoritarian default terms are proper when the source of
inefficient contract terms is friction caused by transaction costs that
make it prohibitively expensive for parties to contract around default
rules, so are they also the proper response to friction caused by the
status quo bias. If the status quo bias will cause some parties to fail to
contract around default terms that are inefficient for them, the best
response is for lawmakers to create default terms that are efficient for
as many parties as possible, reducing the total social cost of status quo
bias friction.
It is ironic that while the status quo bias provides an argument in
favor of majoritarian defaults (at least relative to penalty defaults), it
simultaneously casts doubt on the conventional wisdom for how
lawmakers can identify majoritarian defaults. Typically, identifying
majoritarian defaults requires lawmakers to look at the contracting be-
havior of contracting parties. Given that efficient contract terms are
Pareto-superior to inefficient terms (because the parties can use side
payments to divide the additional value created by efficient terms,
making both parties better off), legal economists assume that con-
tracting parties will settle on them, except in situations of high trans-
action costs.23 4 It follows from this assumption that if few parties
contract around a default rule, it must be efficient and should be re-
tained, whereas if most parties contract around the default, it must be
inefficient and should be changed. In a textbook example of this
methodological approach, J. Hoult Verkerke recently argued that the
proper majoritarian default rule of employment contracts should per-
mit dismissal "at will" rather than only for 'Just cause" because only
234 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 231, at 829 (describing the accepted wisdom concern-
ing majoritarian default terms).
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fifteen percent of employers and employees contract around the stan-
dard "at will" default.235
Evidence of the status quo bias suggests that this methodology is
highly suspect: that parties do not contract around an existing default
is not necessarily evidence that the rule is optimal, even if transaction
costs are low. In order to identify majoritarian default terms,
lawmakers must imagine a counterfactual world-one without any de-
faults-and attempt to predict which terms most parties would agree
upon in such a world. Such an approach obviously carries a high risk
of error. Fortunately, superior approaches exist to avoid the ineffi-
cient contracting that can result from the status quo bias.
D. The Case for Tailoring
The three experimental scenarios described in this Article implic-
itly assume, as do most discussions of default rules, that whatever the
applicable default contract term, it will be applied by courts to all con-
tracting parties that fail to provide an explicitly contrary term in their
contract: all sellers will be liable for either all damages proximately
caused by its breach or only reasonably foreseeable damages (unless
they contract around the default term) 236; all sellers will or will not be
able to rely on the impossibility excuse 23 7 ; all parties will or will not be
governed by a loser pays fee allocation rule. 238 All of these terms,
then, are "untailored" defaults, in the sense that they apply to all af-
fected parties regardless of the unique characteristics of the parties or
their circumstances.
Default rules need not be untailored, however. Rather than
favoring all carriers or shippers, or all buyers or sellers, "tailored" de-
fault rules require lawmakers-generally judges-to create default
terms to govern a relationship between contracting parties based on
the specific characteristics and circumstances of those parties.23 9 For
example, the UCC's default price term-a "reasonable" price 24 0-is a
tailored default, because it requires a judge to consider the circum-
stances of the parties and the transaction before determining the un-
specified price, instead of applying a uniform rule to all parties.
235 J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. Rv. 837, 867-75.
286 See infra Appendices B1-2.
237 See infra Appendices G1-2.
288 See infra Appendices D1-3.
239 See Ayres, supra note 15, at 4 ("'[T] ailored' defaults condition legal treatment on
particular attributes or conduct of the contracting parties."); cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Fore-
word: TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 24, 59 (1992) ("Standards allow
the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of
circumstances.").
240 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1995).
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While the content of untailored defaults is clear to all contracting par-
ties ex ante through statutory text or judicial precedent, the content
of tailored defaults is unclear to parties prior to contracting. Because
of the situation-specific inquiry that they demand, tailored default
terms cannot be given content until after the parties complete their
contract and a contingency occurs for which the contract does not
explicitly provide. In this sense, untailored defaults bear a close re-
semblance to what are often known as "rules" in the familiar rules/
standards dichotomy,2 41 whereas tailored defaults bear a close resem-
blance to what are termed "standards. ' 242 The lawmaker charged with
determining a tailored default term must ask not what term most con-
tracting parties would have agreed to had they made provisions for a
contingency-a question that does not require an inquiry into the
specifics of any one transaction-but what term two particular parties
would have agreed to had they provided for the contingency.
The arguments for tailored versus untailored default terms gener-
ally mirror those of standards versus rules.2 43 Untailored defaults, like
rules in the rules/standards dichotomy, enhance ex ante private or-
dering by making the law clear and predictable to those governed by
it,2 44 but they are usually overinclusive. If most carriers are superior
241 The rules/standards construct is usually credited to Duncan Kennedy. Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976). For
a detailed description of the differences between the two forms, see KELMAN, supra note 13,
at 15-63. For different perspectives on the tradeoffs between the use of rules and standards
in the law generally, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuxE LJ. 557 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Prperty Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577
(1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Sullivan, supra
note 239.
242 There are at least two schools of thought on the difference between rules and stan-
dards. Under one, rules reduce the number of factors relevant to a legal determination
more than do standards. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974) ("[T]hat the outcome of a dispute, if
it is litigated, will be determined by application of a rule rather than a standard should
make it easier for the parties to predict the outcome."). Under the other, rules provide
clear notice of the legal threshold of behavior ex ante, whereas standards can be applied to
particular parties only ex post. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 241, at 557 ("[S] tandards tend
to be more costly for individuals to interpret when deciding how to act and for an adjudica-
tor to apply to past conduct."). Under either definition, tailored defaults resemble stan-
dards-they permit decisionmakers to consider more factors and they can be known with
certainty only after a dispute arises-and untailored defaults resemble rules-they con-
strain the scope of factual inquiry and can be known with certainty by parties prior to
contracting. For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between the tailored/un-
tailored default rules dichotomy and the rules/standards dichotomy, see Ayres, supra note
15, at 1-6.
243 A detailed description of the usual arguments for and against rules and standards is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a useful overview of the standard positions familiar in
most areas of legal discourse, see Schlag, supra note 241, at 383-90.
244 Cf. Rose, supra note 241, at 590 ("[P]recise entitlements facilitate the efficient allo-
cation of goods; they allow us to identify right-holders and to organize trades with them
until all goods arrive in the hands of those who value them most."); Sullivan, supra note
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risk avoiders to most shippers, for example, an untailored default
term making carriers liable for all damages proximately caused by
their breach of contract whether foreseeable or not, while more effi-
cient than a foreseeable-damages term, will be inefficient for the mi-
nority of contracting parties between whom the shipper is the
superior risk avoider. 245 At best, the minority parties are forced to
incur the costs of contracting around the untailored default. A tai-
lored default, under which a court decides which term is efficient for
each set of contracting parties, has the benefit of avoiding this prob-
lem, 24 6 but at the cost of creating ex ante uncertainty as to the parties'
rights, 24 7 and burdening courts that must determine tailored default
terms anew for each set of disputants. 248
The status quo bias adds another wrinkle to this comparison, en-
hancing the argument for tailored defaults even when transaction
costs (as traditionally understood249) are low. As the experiments re-
ported in this Article demonstrate, contracting parties can perceive
untailored default terms, by virtue of their clarity prior to contracting,
as the status quo. When those parties prefer the status quo to alterna-
tive states of the world, all else being equal, they will choose not to
contract around the untailored default rule in some instances even
when the rule is economically inefficient for them. Lawmakers can
use tailored defaults, in contrast, to avoid the contractual inefficien-
cies created by the status quo bias. Because parties cannot know the
exact content of a tailored default term at the time of contracting,
they are unable to perceive the content of a tailored default as the
status quo. If the parties do not know whether, in the absence of an
explicit contract term, a court forced to resolve a later dispute be-
239, at 62 ("[R]ules afford certainty and predictability to private actors, enabling them to
order their affairs productively.").
245 For readers who are growing tired of the Hadley hypothetical, Douglas Baird and
Robert Weisberg illustrate the overinclusiveness problem of rules (relative to standards) in
the contract context with a hypothetical fact pattern involving the default warranty term.
Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassess-
ment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. Rxv. 1217, 1250-51 (1982).
246 Cf id. at 1249 (arguing that a benefit of standards (relative to rules) is that stan-
dards permit more "parties to get the terms they want without the costs associated with
establishing them through negotiations").
247 Cf Sullivan, supra note 239, at 62 ("Standards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling
socially productive behavior.").
248 If disputes arise frequently, a regime of legal standards requiring case-by-case, fact-
specific analysis will be more expensive to administer than a regime of bright-line rules. See
id. at 63 ("[R]ules promote economies for the legal decisionmaker by minimizing the elab-
orate, time-consuming, and repetitive application of background principles to facts.").
Some have argued, however, that if disputes arise infrequently, it might be more expensive
to create an initial set of clear rules than to resolve the relatively few disputes that arise
under a standard that is easier to promulgate ex ante. See Kaplow, supra note 241, at 621-
22.
249 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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tween them would find the carrier liable for all damages flowing from
its breach or only liable for foreseeable damages, there is no status
quo position to anchor the parties' preferences for either of the po-
tential contract terms. Contract default rules cannot be neutral25 0-
they must favor some terms over others-but tailored defaults can
shroud the law's preference at the time of contracting, when the sta-
tus quo bias operates.
Consider the possibility of the following tailored default rule gov-
erning the Hadley parties, as opposed to either untailored default
heretofore presented:
In the event that contracting parties do not specify the extent of the
breaching party's liability for consequential damages suffered by the
nonbreaching party, the breaching party will be liable for conse-
quential damages that are reasonable under the circumstances, tak-
ing into account which party was in a better position to avoid and/
or insure against the risk of damages.
Under this default rule, parties that would bargain to the efficient
consequential damages term in the absence of the status quo bias and
transaction costs would either (1) bargain to the efficient term (if
transaction costs are low), or (2) leave a gap in the contract, requiring
a court to identify, if a breach occurs, what term the parties would
have agreed upon had they addressed the issue (if transaction costs
are high). In either case, the efficient term would govern the parties'
relationship, unimpeded by any status quo bias.25'
E. Nonenforcement Defaults
Although contract default rules usually specify how courts will fill
gaps in private contracts, they can announce instead that courts will
refuse to fill certain contractual gaps, thereby declining to enforce
contracts with such gaps altogether. The most notable example of a
nonenforcement default rule in contract law is section 2-201 of the
250 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 58, at 229 (pointing out that background legal rules cannot
be neutral because even the government's refusal to act favors some rights claimants over
others).
251 Although tailored default rules should eliminate the default term as a source of
status quo bias, it is possible that parties may respond by looking elsewhere for evidence of
a status quo term rather than behaving as if there were no such term. It is, for example,
possible that when the default rule yields no clear status quo allocation of rights and re-
sponsibilities, parties will then take local or industry norms into account. This question
requires further research. Even if tailored defaults cause parties to substitute industry
norms for default terms as the perceived status quo, however, tailored defaults would still
play an important role in lessening the number of inefficient contract terms attributable to
the status quo bias. Although industry norms are not tailored to the specific circumstances
of particular parties, because they are specific to an industry they are substantially more
tailored than untailored, majoritarian defaults. Consequently, they are far more likely
than untailored, majoritarian defaults to reflect an optimally efficient allocation of rights
and responsibilities between two parties in that industry.
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UCC, which provides that contracts for the sale of goods that do not
specify a quantity term are not enforceable. 252
Like tailored defaults, lawmakers can use nonenforcement de-
faults as a tool to reduce the impact of the status quo bias on contract
terms.253 Although tailored defaults avoid the status quo bias by not
creating a status quo term that acts as an illusory endowment, nonen-
forcement defaults neutralize the status quo bias by literally over-
whelming it: they create a status quo term that all contracting parties
will dislike so intensely, that even parties with a strong preference for
the status quo will not fail to contract around it. Recall that the status
quo bias will affect the contracts of parties that only marginally prefer
an alternative term to the default, but will not affect the contracts of
parties with a strong preference for an alternative term.25 4 Because all
parties who go to the trouble of negotiating and drafting contracts
presumably have a strong preference for enforcement of the contract
over nonenforcement, few, if any, parties will only marginally dis-
prefer a nonenforcement default and thus fail to contract around it
because of a preference for the status quo.
Because tailored and nonenforcement defaults, in theory, can be
equally successful at neutralizing the status quo bias, lawmakers con-
cerned with minimizing the bias should choose between these two op-
tions on the basis of their relative costs along other dimensions. The
most significant disadvantage of nonenforcement defaults is the harsh
consequences that occur if they are ever invoked. Consequently, non-
enforcement defaults will be an appropriate means of minimizing the
status quo bias when the relevant contract term relates to a high-
probability contingency or a highly salient aspect of the contract, such
that the likelihood of the parties failing to contract around the nonen-
forcement default are low. The most important shortcoming of tai-
lored defaults is that, like other standards, they impose high ex post
costs on courts forced to determine highly individuating default
terms. Accordingly, tailored defaults will be an appropriate response
to the problem of the status quo bias if a contract term relates to a
low-probability contingency, such that courts will have to create party-
specific default terms only infrequently.
252 U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1995).
253 Ayres and Gertner classify nonenforcement defaults as a type of penalty defaults
that penalize both parties for failing to reveal information through the contracting pro-
cess. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 95-97. Thus, nonenforcement defaults can serve an
information-forcing purpose when both parties, rather than just one, are likely to possess
material private information that, if not revealed, could impede efficient contracting. My
argument does not take away from this point; rather, it argues that courts can use nonen-
forcement defaults for a different purpose than the one suggested by Ayres and Gertner.
254 See supra Part I.D.
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The UCC's nonenforcement default rule for the quantity term in
the sale of goods255 is a particularly apt example of how this theory
should be applied. Because a quantity term is critical in every contract
for the sale of goods, and because it is a term of high salience to the
contracting parties, the cost of filling gaps in contracts that fail to
specify a quantity term with a nonenforcement default is relatively
low-few parties are likely to fail to specify a quantity term in the face
of such a threat. On the other hand, a tailored default for unspecified
quantity terms would have relatively high costs; if parties were not dis-
couraged from leaving a gap by a nonenforcement default, courts
would be forced to tailor quantity terms quite frequently. Conse-
quently, a nonenforcement default appropriately governs the quantity
term in a contract. In contrast, the default rule for whether a contract
includes an impossibility excuse is better served by a tailored than a
nonenforcement default. Because the contract term would govern a
low-probability contingency, courts would incur the costs of tailoring
relatively infrequently. In addition, because it governs a low-
probability contingency, parties would be likely to leave the term un-
specified fairly often even under the threat of a nonenforcement
default.
CONCLUSION
This Article has made the positive claim that the preference ex-
ogeneity assumption, implicit in all law-and-economics theories of effi-
cient contract default rule selection, is probably false, and the
normative claim that its falsity has important implications for effi-
ciency theory. Lawmakers' choice of default terms is likely to affect
contracting parties' preferences for substantive contract terms. Con-
tracting parties may view the default term-the term that will govern
the parties if they fail to contract for an explicit term-as a status quo
endowment. Because individuals tend to prefer the status quo to al-
ternative states, they are likely to prefer the default term, whatever it
may be, to other options, all other things being equal.
As a result, theoreticians and lawmakers concerned with creating
efficient default rules must add to and account for in their analysis
another source of contractual inefficiency in addition to the usual lit-
any: not only might parties fail to contract around inefficient default
rules because of high transaction costs or strategic incentives to with-
hold private information, they might also fail to contract around inef-
ficient defaults when their preference for maintaining the status quo
relative to alternative states swamps their preference for the alterna-
tive contract term relative to the default term. This additional source
255 U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995).
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of contractual inefficiency counsels lawmakers toward majoritarian
rather than penalty default rules, and toward tailored or nonenforce-
ment defaults rather than untailored defaults generally.
There is a (weak) positive hypothesis, which could serve as the
basis for further development, to accompany this normative conclu-
sion. Although the rich fabric of contract law contains default rules
that can be classified as majoritarian, penalty, nonenforcement, tai-
lored, and untailored, both the common law of contracts and the
UCC's article 2-the modem law of contracts for the sale of
goods256-tend to favor, on balance, tailored default rules. The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts' catch-all statement of the law of default
rules provides that when contracting parties "have not agreed with re-
spect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights
and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is sup-
plied by the court,"2 57 a perfect example of a tailored default. Under
the UCC, to select just a few of many possible examples, when parties
do not explicitly provide a price for goods in their contract, the court
will impose a "reasonable price";2 8 the default term for time of deliv-
ery is a "reasonable time";259 and a requirements contract permits the
buyer to demand any amount of goods from the seller "as may occur
in good faith," except that it can be "no quantity unreasonably dispro-
portionate to any stated estimate or... to any normal or otherwise
comparable prior ... requirement[ ]."260 This structure of contract
default rules is consistent with an implicit concern for the effects of
the status quo bias and an empirical hunch that, in most circum-
stances, the costs of tailored defaults will be less than the costs of non-
enforcement defaults.2 61
These textual snippets obviously provide scant evidence on which
to base an all-out positivist claim that contract law does favor, as op-
posed to my primary claim that it should favor, tailored default terms
because they minimize inefficient contracting caused by the status
quo bias. Perhaps they do suggest, however, that the policy of neutral-
izing the status quo bias as efficiently as possible in the selection of
default rules, heretofore not explicitly discussed by contract law theo-
rists, is one of the policy considerations embedded deep within our
complex system of contract law.
256 Id. § 2-102.
257 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRAC=S § 204 (1981).
258 U.C.C. § 2-305(1).
259 Id § 2-309(1).
260 Id § 2-306.
261 It is important to qualify this point, however, by noting that this structure of default
rules is also consistent with a hunch that transaction costs, as traditionally understood, are





The attached survey asks you to play the role of an attorney advising a
commercial client during contract negotiations with one of its customers.
You are asked to consider three issues and then to answer 2-4 questions about
each concerning how you would advise your client. No knowledge of con-
tract or commercial law is required; the relevant law needed to assess the
situations presented is provided in each scenario. In fact, you should rely only
on the law as it is described to you in the survey for purposes of answering the ques-
tions. Do not rely on your prior understanding of contract law.
This survey is part of a research study that seeks to better understand
how lawyers and law students think about selected contract issues. There are
no right answers to any of the questions. It is important for the success of the
survey that you read each section slowly and carefully, and that you provide
the advice that you believe you would provide if you were actually advising a
client, assuming, of course, that your knowledge of the relevant facts and law
were limited to what is provided in the questionnaire. Please do not discuss
the questionnaire with anyone else prior to completing it.
Your participation-which will take about 15 minutes-is greatly appre-
ciated but not required. The responses that you provide will be aggregated
with other responses, and you will not be personally identified.





You represent a company called "NextDay" that specializes in overnight
delivery of packages (similar to Federal Express). NextDay has reached an
agreement in principle to provide shipping services for a company called
"Gifts, Inc." (which markets gifts by catalog and ships orders overnight
around the country) for a fixed per-package charge, regardless of the size,
value, or destination of the package. The company that handled Gifts, Inc.'s
shipping last year charged it $20 per package; the price that Gifts, Inc. will
pay NextDay has not yet been finalized.
You are currently engaged in negotiations with Gifts, Inc. over certain
provisions of the contract. NextDay's management has asked you to provide
recommendations concerning certain issues that have arisen and will almost
certainly rely on your advice. At the end of the year, NextDay will review how
it fared under the contract you negotiate and decide whether to retain you as
their attorney in future dealings, so you have a strong personal stake in mak-
ing sure that the contract serves the needs of NextDay and reflects well on





The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship be-
tween the parties, follows the traditional legal rule that delivery companies
like NextDay that negligently lose a package or fail to deliver it on time-
which happens occasionally-are generally liable only for damages that were
"reasonably foreseeable" at the time the delivery company takes possession of the
package from the shipper.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed that you contract around this rule by adding a
term to your contract with them that states:
"NextDay will be liable for all damages proximately caused by NextDay's
negligent failure to deliver Gifts, Inc. 's merchandise on time, whether or not
such damages were reasonably foreseeable when NextDay accepted merchan-
dise from Gifts, Inc."
Such a term in the contract would be fully enforceable in court.
Gifts, Inc. has explained that it will be sending many packages with
NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its corporate cli-
ents and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure to make delivery
could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious from looking at the pack-
age itself. It would like to be protected fully from this risk. Of course, Gifts,
Inc. understands that it will have to pay a higher per-package fee to
NextDay-over and above what the contract rate would otherwise be-for
NextDay to agree to add the proposed term increasing its liability.
You must now recommend to NextDay's management the minimum
amount per package that you believe NextDay should demand if it is to include
Gifts, Inc.'s proposed term in the contract-you will, of course, attempt to
negotiate for more than that minimum demand, but you need to establish a
"bottom line" before you begin to negotiate.
You do not have a precise way to predict how much extra liability the
proposed term would create above the liability that would exist under the
usual "reasonably foreseeable" damages rule. Based on the value of Gifts,
Inc.'s shipments with other companies over the last several years and
NextDay's history of occasionally failing to. make deliveries on time,
NextDay's accountants have estimated for you that, statistically, the chances
are better than 95% that an enhanced liability provision will end up costing
NextDay between $0 and $10 per package, on average (this takes into ac-
count that few packages will be mishandled but those that are could subject
NextDay to substantial liability) -within this range the accountants cannot
predict the exact cost the provision would have. The accountants believe it is
very unlikely that such a provision would either (a) not increase NextDay's
costs at all, or (b) increase them more than $10 per package, on average.
QUESTIONS
What is the minimum additional charge per package, over and above what the
per-package rate would otherwise be, that you will recommend that NextDay
insist upon in return for agreeing to Gifts, Inc.'s proposed expansion of lia-
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bility (i.e., if Gifts, Inc. refuses to pay at least this much, you would recom-
mend that NextDay refuse to include the proposed enhanced liability
provision in the contract)? Choose one of the following choices:
I would recommend a minimum of $1 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $2 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $3 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $4 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $5 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $6 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $7 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $8 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $9 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $10 additional per package
I would recommend that NextDay refuse to include the proposed
term at any price.
Is the law concerning contract damages described in this problem con-
sistent with your prior understanding of the law?





The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship be-
tween the parties, specifies that delivery companies like NextDay are liable
for "all damages proximately caused by the delivery company's negligent failure to
deliver a shipper's merchandise on time."
NextDay would like to add a term to its contract with Gifts, Inc. that
would limit its liability for negligently failing to deliver on time-which hap-
pens occasionally-by stating that:
"In the event that NextDay fails to deliver Gifts, Inc.'s merchandise on time,
its liability will be limited to damages that were reasonably foreseeable when
NextDay accepted merchandise from Gifts, Inc."
Such a term in the contract would be fully enforceable in court.
Gifts, Inc. has explained that it will be sending many packages with
NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its corporate cli-
ents, and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure to make delivery
could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious from the package itself. It
likes that the law fully protects it from this risk (by making NextDay liable for
all damages). NextDay understands that it will have to pay Gifts, Inc.-in the
form of giving Gifts, Inc. a discount on what it would otherwise charge per
package for overnight delivery-if it is to induce Gifts, Inc. to accept
NextDay's proposed liability limitation provision.
You must now recommend to NextDay's management the maximum per-
package discount that you believe NextDay should offer Gifts, Inc. in exchange
for Gifts, Inc. including the proposed term in the contract-you will, of
course, attempt to negotiate for less than the maximum discount, but you
need to establish an "upper limit" before you begin to negotiate.
You do not have a precise way to predict how much NextDay would save
by convincing Gifts, Inc. to include the liability limitation clause in the con-
tract. Based on the value of Gifts, Inc.'s shipments with other companies
over the last several years (which they have documented for you) and
NextDay's history of occasionally failing to make deliveries on time,
NextDay's accountants have estimated for you that statistically there is a bet-
ter than 95% likelihood that the limitation provision will save NextDay be-
tween $0 and $10 per package, on average (this takes into account that few
packages will be mishandled but those that are could subject NextDay to sub-
stantial liability under the usual liability rule)-within this range the account-
ants cannot predict precisely how much savings such a provision would
create. The accountants believe it is very unlikely that such a provision would
either (a) not increase NextDay's costs at all, or (b) increase them more than
$10 per package, on average.
QUESTIONS
What is the maximum discount per package, below what the per-package rate
would otherwise be, that you will recommend that NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. in
return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include the liability limitation provision in
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the contract (i.e., if Gifts, Inc. refuses to agree to the provisions for that
amount or less, you would recommend that NextDay accept the usual liability
prescribed by law)? Choose one of the following choices
I would recommend a maximum discount of $1 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $2 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $3 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $4 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $5 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $6 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $7 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $8 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $9 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $10 per package.
I would recommend that NextDay refuse to offer any discount for the
provision.
Is the law concerning contract damages described in this problem consistent
with your prior understanding of the law?





Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it impossible
or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation of provid-
ing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as in most
others, the occurrence of a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond
the control of the delivery company that makes it physically impossible or
commercially impractical within reason for it to meet its delivery obligation
constitutes a valid excuse for non-performance of the delivery obligation. In
such a situation the delivery company must refund the money it charged its
customer for the delivery but is not responsible for any additional damages.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed its contract with NextDay include the following
provision, which would be enforceable:
"NextDay will be liable for applicable contract damages should it fail to de-
liver a package on the next day, as promised under the contract, regardless of
the occurrence of any contingency, whether or not it is unforeseen or beyond
NextDay 's control."
Gifts, Inc. is planning to offer NextDay a flat amount of money in return
for NextDay agreeing to include this term in the contract for next year.
NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn revenues
of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be profit.
Agreeing to include this term in the contract would increase NextDay's expo-
sure to the possibility that events beyond its control could result in substantial
liability.
QUESTIONS
What is the minimum amount of money that you would recommend that
NextDay demand from Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the lowest amount that NextDay
should be willing to accept, not the amount it should propose in initial
negotiations)?
$ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next year's
contract).
What amount would you recommend that NextDay put forward as its initial
demand for the inclusion of the provision (as opposed to the minimum
amount it would accept)?







Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it impossible
or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation of provid-
ing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as in most
others, the occurrence of such a contingency is no defense to a breach of
contract claim-that is, NextDay is still held liable for damages despite occur-
rences beyond its control.
NextDay would like to propose to Gifts, Inc. that the contract between
the two include the following provision, which would be enforceable:
"If a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond NextDay's control oc-
curs making it physically impossible or commercially impractical within rea-
son for NextDay to meet its 'next day' delivery obligation, NextDay will
refund the money paid for the shipment of the package but Gifts, Inc. will not
be entitled to any additional contract damages."
NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn reve-
nues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be profit.
NextDay is considering offering Gifts, Inc. a flat amount of money in return
for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include this term in their contract for next year,
thus reducing NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond its
control could result in substantial liability and reduced profits.
QUESTIONS
What is the maximum amount of money that you would recommend that
NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above provision in
the contract for next year (i.e., the most that NextDay should be willing to
pay, not the amount it should propose in initial negotiations)?
$ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next year's
contract).
What amount do you recommend NextDay put forward as its initial offer for
the inclusion of the above provision (as opposed to the maximum amount it
would be willing to pay)?







When private parties litigate a legal dispute between them, each gener-
ally must pay its own attorneys' fees. However, if the parties wish to specify by
contract that in any future litigation the losing party must pay the attorneys'
fees of the prevailing party, such a provision is fully enforceable. Such provi-
sions have the potential to discourage lawsuits that lack merit (because the
plaintiff will have to pay the defendant's fees) and could encourage the
prompt settlement of suits that are meritorious (because the defendant will
want to limit the plaintiff's fees as well as its own). On the other hand, such
provisions also have the potential to discourage out-of-court settlement of
disputes that both parties believe they will win (because each will assume it
will have its attorneys' fees reimbursed) and could discourage some meritori-
ous suits from being brought.
Would you favor or oppose adding a provision to NextDay's contract
with Gifts, Inc. stating that, should litigation arise between the parties, the
losing party must pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party?
Favor adding such a provision
(switch from the usual fee allocation rule)
Not favor adding such a provision
(stay with the usual fee allocation rule)
On the following 1-5 scale, indicate how strongly you feel about your
previous response (please circle only 1 of the answer choices):
5 4 3 2 1
Feel Very Strongly Feel Unsure
(unlikely to change mind) (could easily change mind)
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior understanding
of the law?





Under the law of your state, in litigation arising from disputes between
merchants, the losing party generally must pay the attorneys' fees of the pre-
vailing party. However, if the parties wish to specify by contract that in any
future litigation each party must pay its own attorneys' fees, such a provision
would be fully enforceable. Such provisions have the potential to encourage
the prompt out-of court settlement of disputes that both parties believe they
would win (because each will have to bear its own fees regardless of out-
come) and could encourage the filing of more meritorious lawsuits. On the
other hand, such provisions also have the potential to encourage lawsuits that
lack merit (because the plaintiff will not have to fear paying the defendant's
legal fees) and could discourage the prompt settlement of suits that are meri-
torious (because the defendant will not have as strong of an incentive to
minimize attorneys' fees).
Would you favor or oppose adding a provision to NextDay's contract
with Gifts, Inc. stating that, should litigation arise between the parties, each
party must pay their own attorneys' fees?
Favor adding such a provision
(switch from the usual fee allocation rule)
Not favor adding such a provision
(stay with the usual fee allocation rule)
On the following 1- 5 scale, indicate how strongly you feel about your
previous response (please circle only 1 of the answer choices):
5 4 3 2 1
Feel Very Strongly Feel Unsure
(unlikely to change mind) (could easily change mind)






DESCR= ON OF SITUATION
Under the law of your state, for either party to seek court adjudication of
a dispute between merchants arising out of a contract, the contract in ques-
tion must include one of the following two provisions. Some of the pros and
cons of each are provided:
(1) In the case of litigation between the parties to this contract, each party will
pay its own attorneys'fees.
This provision has the potential to encourage the prompt out-of-court
settlement of disputes that both parties believe they would win (because each
will have to bear its own fees regardless of outcome) and could encourage
the filing of more meritorious lawsuits. On the other hand, it also has the
potential to encourage lawsuits that lack merit (because the plaintiff wil not
have to fear paying the defendant's legal fees) and could discourage the
prompt settlement of suits that are meritorious (because the defendant will
not have an incentive to minimize the plaintiff's fees as well as its own).
(2) In the case of litigation between the parties to this contract, the losing party
will pay the attorneys'fees of the prevailing party.
Such a provision has the potential to discourage lawsuits that lack merit
(because the plaintiff will have to pay the defendant's fees) while encourag-
ing prompt settlement of suits that are meritorious (because the defendant
will want to limit the plaintiff's fees as well as its own). On the other hand, it
also has the potential to discourage out-of-court settlement in disputes where
both parties believe they will win (because each will assume it will have its
attorneys' fees reimbursed) and could discourage some meritorious suits
from being brought.




On the following 1-5 scale, indicate how strongly you feel about your
previous response (please circle only 1 of the answer choices):
5 4 3 2 1
Feel Very Strongly Feel Unsure
(unlikely to change mind) (could easily change mind)
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior understanding
of the law?
Not Sure/Don't Know
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